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INTRODUCTION

The physiciani who treats a suicidal patient faces real life-or-death
J.D., M.Ed., Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University
M.D., F.A.C.P., F.A.P.A., Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of Miami
School of Medicine
1. Physicians receive education and clinical experience to recognize factors which
increase the probability that a patient is suicidal. See infra text accompanying
notes 23-61. Consequently, the presence of these factors should alert all physicians that their patients might be suicidal. Indeed, the failure to diagnose su*
**
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decisions. The primary decision depends on his 2 professional evaluation of the likelihood that his patient will take his own life. If the
physician concludes that suicide is imminent, medical ethics and the
law require he take steps to protect his patient. Failing to take appropriate protective action, either "too little [or] too much restraint,"3 exposes the physician to legal liability. The physician owes a duty to his
patient, but defining parameters of this duty and methods to satisfy it
are not clear. Neither the legal system nor current medical knowledge or practice establishes guidelines to aid the doctor.
The law fails to provide assistance because courts dealing with the
problem have reached inconsistent results based on muddled analysis.
Medical research provides exhaustive information about suicide, including some verified factors for determining whether a patient is suicidal,4 but fails to accurately predict whether a particular patient will
take his own life. In fact, predictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong far more often than they are
right.5 Using standard, generally-accepted predictors, physicians will
misidentify twenty-five potential suicides for every one person who
actually kills himself.6 Thus, the physician's dilemma: the difficulty
of predicting the suicide of any one individual makes it almost impossible to decide how much intervention is necessary to achieve the twin
goals of treating a patient's underlying illness and saving his life. Nevertheless, under the current system the physician is exposed to legal
liability for failing to do just that.
The suicide of any individual is difficult to predict for a number of
reasons. First, a person who has killed himself obviously cannot proicidality would be malpractice if other physicians would have recognized that the
patient was suicidal.
It is important to note, however, that a physician is only liable if his practice
falls below the acceptable standard of care of other doctors in his specialty. While
all medical doctors must be capable of identifying suicidal patients, the standard
by which their treatment decisions will be judged is that of their specialty. As a
result, psychiatrists, who have particular training and experience in treating suicidal patients, would be held to a higher standard of care in protecting patients
from suicide than other specialists. Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127,
1137-38 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
2. Masculine pronouns are used for readability only. No sexist implications are
intended.
3. BENJAMIN M. ScHUTz,LEGAL LIABILITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 75 (1982). "Both too
little and too much restraint may be grounds for liability-the former for malpractice, the latter for abridgement of civil rights."
4. See infra text accompanying notes 49-61.
5. Keith Hawton, Assessment of Suicide Risk, 150 BRrr. J. PSYCHIATRY 145, 145

(1987). "While suicide risk factors may be useful in identifying high risk groups
of individuals, such criteria are far less useful when it comes to predicting risk in
the individual patient." Id.
6. George E. Murphy, Prevention of Suicide, in 7 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 403, 406

(Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales eds., 1988).
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vide information about factors which led to his suicide.7 Consequently, analysis of suicides often relies on some degree of speculation,
and psychological autopsies are of limited value.8 Another obstacle to
understanding, and thus predicting, suicide is the substantial
probability of underreporting. 9 Many people who kill themselves are
not recorded as suicides due to religious, social or moral stigma.' 0 In
addition, recognition of a suicide risk may prompt intervention, which
may prevent, or at least postpone, suicide.11 Intervention, even when
appropriate, further distorts the statistics and lessens their value as
predictors. Prospective studies would be necessary to better predict
who might actually commit suicide, but even these studies would have
limitations. "[P]rospective studies of suicide require enormous samples from the general population and sizeable samples from the population who seem to be at high risk for suicide."12 Even though the
suicide rate is consistently about twelve per 100,000 population,13 it
remains "a rare and not very predictable event." 14 These problems all
contribute to the error rate of twenty-four out of twenty-five when
attempting to predict who will commit suicide.
Explaining or understanding the high error rate, while informa7. Frank Engelsmann & Jambur Ananth, Suicide Rating Scales, 6 PSYCHIATRIC J.
UNrV. OTTAWA 47, 50 (1981).

8. One recent article proposes use of a psychological autopsy as useful "in laying the
case to rest.... The focus should be less on 'what did we do wrong?' and more on
what can be learned from this and what can be done better." Neil S. Kaye &
Stephen M. Soreff, The Psychiatrist'sRole, Responses, and ResponsibilitiesWhen
a Patient Commits Suicide, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 739, 742 (1991).
9. George P. Smith II, All's Well That Ends Welk Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely EnlightenedSelf-Determination,22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
275, 279 (1989)[hereinafter All's Well]. Under-reporting is generally a result of
agreement between family members and physicians to disguise the less obvious
suicides to avoid "any social stigma from attaching to the surviving relatives." Id.
10. Irwin N. Perr, Liability of Hospitaland Psychiatristin Suicide, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 631, 634 (1965).

11. Cf. Bruce Block & Mahmud Behfar, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1092, 1092 (Letter
1991). ("[Ils it not possible that patients with suicidal ideation had a lower shortterm suicide rate only because such ideation resulted in their receiving more
treatment within the 1-year interval than patients without suicidal ideation?").
12. Lee N. Robins & Pamela A. Kulbok, EpidemiologicStudies in Suicide, in 7 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 289, 289 (Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales eds., 1988).
13. Robert M.A. Hirschfeld & Lucy Davidson, Risk Factorsfor Suicide, in 7 REVIEW
OF PSYCHIATRY 307, 307 (Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales eds., 1988)(citing
National Center for Health Statistics 1986). This means approximately 29,000
persons commit suicide every year. Although the total number is too small on
which to base accurate predictions, suicide is the eighth leading cause of death in
the United States. Id
Estimates vary. Some suggest there are 15 suicides per 100,000. Still, this
means only 1% of all deaths are from suicide. David Lester et al., Extrapolation

From Attempted Suicides to Completed Suicides: A Test, 88 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 78, 78 (1979)[hereinafter Extrapolation].
14. Robins & Kulbok, supra note 12, at 289.
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tive, does not make it any less troubling and, combined with the fundamental state and individual interests implicated, means otherwise
valuable treatment plans may simply be unacceptable in certain situations. Because a physician cannot foresee if a particular patient will
kill himself, even careful, conscientious physician's treatment decisions are fraught with uncertainty. Additionally, the spectre of legal
liability for a patient's suicide may, consciously or unconsciously, influence a physician's decision, 15 inappropriately clouding what should
be solely a medical decision.16
This Article briefly reviews current medical knowledge concerning
suicide. It suggests that the physician must determine, aided by a proposed, defined list of risk factors, whether his patient is suicidal. If the
patient is suicidal, the physician must expand his evaluation to determine if an underlying mental disease exists.17 If he discovers a disease, the physician must decide whether suicidal thoughts and
impulses are the product of this underlying disorder. Where suicidal
thoughts and impulses are the product of an underlying mental disease, the physician can-in fact, should-take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide.
This Article proposes a set of procedures all physiciansl 8 should
15. "The painful reality is that one may be functioning as an ethical and competent
therapist on a case and still face a lawsuit; that is, ethical and competent behavior
is not an absolute bar to a legitimate suit." SCHUrz, supra note 3, at x. Schutz
says the issue of legal liability for psychotherapy provokes "intense anxiety and
anger." Id. at ix. He suggests the reason for this discomfort is the perception
held by many therapists of law as an unreasonable and capricious parent. As a
result, many therapists simply avoid the issues. "They out-legalize the lawyers
and avoid pushing at their own or their patients' frontiers.... Their adherence to
the law does undermine clinical effectiveness ....
Id. at x.
He advocates "exactly the situation that we present our patients-that risk is
inevitable in all worthwhile ventures.... We cannot, and should not, fail to undertake a project because of the risk, or be more concerned with safety than with
healing." Id.
16. An additional, non-medical force which might operate contrary to the patient's
best interest is the burgeoning need for, and thus influence of, third-party payers.
Insurance companies frequently pay only for the least restrictive treatment.
Thus, patients who might benefit from hospitalization are pushed into less effective treatment merely because it is cheaper. Cf., Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal.,
263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Tabor v.
Doctors Memorial Hosp., 563 So. 2d 233, 238 (La. 1990)(physician improperly
changed his decision to hospitalize patient when he learned admission was
blocked by required $400.00 deposit).
17. Overlap exists between these two decisions. In other words, one factor which
should alert the physician to a risk of suicide is the presence of certain underlying
mental illnesses.
18. All physicians must be alert to potentially suicidal patients because three of four
people who kill themselves saw a physician within months of their deaths. Will
That PatientCommit Suicide, PATr.NT CARE, Oct. 1968, at 55. In fact, one psychiatrist estimated the average physician will see six suicidal patients a year, putting
him in a "key position to prevent suicides." Id.
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follow whenever suicide predictors are present and the physician decides the patient's suicidal thoughts and impulses are the product of an
underlying mental illness. These procedures should also improve the
quality of patient care. The physician must obtain the patient's informed consent for the least restrictive plan which would treat the
underlying disease while minimizing the risk of suicide. If, however,
after the physician explains the disease and proposed treatment plan,
the patient refuses to submit, the doctor should intervene even without consent.
A different analysis is suggested if the patient's suicidal thoughts
and impulses are a product of something other than an underlying
mental disease. In this situation, the proposed analysis is similar to
that used in the recent right to die cases. 19 These decisions allow the
competent and conscious patient control over his body and his life despite the wishes of physicians or the State to preserve and protect that
body and life. 20 Because only the person himself experiences his
pain-physical or emotional-only he can decide whether life is worth
continuing.21 By analogy, the Article concludes that an adult whose
suicidal impulses do not stem from an underlying, high-risk mental
disease has a right to kill himself.22 So long as the physician correctly
concluded these thoughts and impulses are not the result of mental
disorder, explained this to the patient, thoroughly explored with him
reasons for and consequences of his proposed actions, and recorded
these, the physician has satisfied his legal responsibility and no basis
for liability exists.
19. One student author suggests that the distinction actually is "between patients
who are generally able to make decisions but made a 'bad' decision this time and
patients who lack decisionmaking ability." Martha Alys Matthews, Comment,
Suicidal Competence and the Patient'sRight to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment,75
CAL. L. REv. 707, 752 (1987)[hereinafter Suicidal Competence]. If the patient's
impaired mental condition is the reason for the decision, the court may consider
the person incompetent. Because the State's interest is in preventing "incompetent" suicides, the State can intervene to prevent these. However, if the patient's
reasons are based on value judgments concerning what degree of pain makes life
not worth living, no valid basis for a finding of incompetence exists. Id. at 752-53.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 225-266.
21. "[R]emember that distress is subjective. Thus, although a nonparticipant may
view a stress engendering situation as within the parameters of tolerable distress,
this in no way may serve to mitigate the real anguish of the individual who, feeling life intolerable, ends it herself by suicide." All's Well, supra note 9, at 317.
22. Libertarians, for example, argue that "the individual, not the state, is considered
the supreme judge of his own best interests. The individual is held to have a right
to self-determination, free choice, and autonomy." H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. &
Michele Maloy, Suicide andAssisting Suicide:A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36
Sw. L.J. 1003, 1010 (1982).
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MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE

When evaluating a patient with suicidal tendencies, a physician engages in a complex decision-making process to assess the degree of risk
of suicide.23 He begins, in the usual medical method, by establishing a
diagnosis because some psychiatric illnesses24 increase the risk of suicide. 25 These illnesses are depression, bipolar disorder, drug and alcohol abuse and dependence, panic disorder, schizoaffective disorder,
schizophrenia, and borderline and antisocial personality disorders.
Moreover, increased risk of suicide correlates with certain aspects of
the patient's history: social isolation, hopelessness, formulation of a
plan, access to lethal means, previous suicide attempt, concurrence of
another illness, and family history of suicide.26 The physician 27 must
consider all these factors when formulating a treatment plan because
each 28 affects the probability of danger to the patient 29 and the physi23. Hawton, supra note 5, at 145-46. Before discussing the factors, the author raises
an interesting point. Although the physician's "major concern" is the probability
of suicide within a very short time span, the factors used focus on long term risk
This problem is further complicated by the fact that events might easily alter a
patient's risk factors.
24. See generally Mauri J. Marttunen et al., Mental Disordersin Adolescent Suicide,
48 ARcHVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 834 (1991).
25. Hirschfeld & Davidson, supranote 13, at 328-29; Paula J. Clayton, Epidemiologic
and Risk Factors in Suicide, in 2 PSYCHIATRY UPDATE 428, 429-30 (Lester Grinspoon ed., 1983).
26. An interesting phenomenon is the association between low levels of serotonin
metabolites in cerebrospinal fluid and increased suicidality. However, the connection is neither sufficiently refined nor understood to be used as a test. Thus, at
least presently, it remains of theoretical, rather than practical, significance.
Michael Stanley & J. John Mann, Biological FactorsAssociated with Suicide, in 7
REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 334 (Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales eds., 1988).
27. The majority of people who kill themselves consulted a physician within months
of their suicide. This fact "places the recognition of suicidal risk squarely on the
doorstep of the physician." George E. Murphy, Recognition of SuicidalRisk: The
Physician'sResponsibility, 62 S. MED. J. 723, 723 (1969).
28. Two commentators raise an interesting correlation between decreased activity attendance and suicide in hospital patients. Byron Fry & Kim Smith, Activity Attendance,Hospital Expectations,and Suicide, 56 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 270 (1984). The
suicidal outpatient tends to withdraw from his relationships and is erratic about
going to school or work. Psychiatric inpatients manifest similar behavior by missing group meetings and failing to attend other activities. Id. at 270. The evidence
illustrated that "seriously suicidal patients" attended activities less frequently the
two to four weeks prior to their attempts. Further, the hospital staff's treatment
philosophy impacted on the suicide rate. Hospitals which were "more 'permissive'" towards regressive acting up had the highest number of suicides and attempts. Id. at 274-75.
29. One author raises an interesting challenge to the validity of studies linking certain psychiatric illnesses with suicide. Hawton, supranote 5, at 145. He suggests
that the findings may not be representative of all people who kill themselves
because they only include deaths where suicide was the official cause of death.
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the cause of death of a person
with a known history of psychiatric illness is more likely to be labeled a suicide,
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cian's potential liability.
Because of the high incidence of suicide among those suffering
3
30
from depression and bipolar disorder, symptoms of mood disorders '
should be carefully sought and explored. Compared with the general
population, the illness of depression 32 makes it six times3 3 more likely
a person will kill himself. Even compared to people with other psychiatric illnesses, those suffering from depression are twice as likely to
commit suicide.34
Depressive disorder is generally treated with antidepressant medication combined with psychotherapy.3 5 Hospitalization is only imperative for patients who either fail to respond to this regimen or are in
imminent danger of suicide. Outpatient treatment is preferable. However, if the physician chooses outpatient care, the treatment plan must
include careful monitoring of the patient and medication because antidepressant medication is sufficiently toxic to be used to commit sui36
cide by overdose.

30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.
36.

leading to an overestimation of psychiatric illness among suicides. Second, people
might have a tendency to try to explain suicide by overreporting psychiatric
symptoms. Id. at 146.
Robert W. Firestone & Richard H. Seiden, Suicide and the Continuum of SelfDestructiveBehavior,38 J.AM . C. HEALTH 207, 208 (1990). One major study concluded that, of investigated suicides in the United States, 47% of the people who
committed suicide were clinically depressed at the time of suicide. Id.
These symptoms include: depressed or irritable mood or loss of interest or pleasure, change in appetite or significant weight change, change in sleep habits with
insomnia or hypersomnia, agitation or retardation in acting or thinking, loss of
energy or increased fatigue, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, indecisiveness or a diminished ability to think or concentrate. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRic AssoCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
III-R 222 (3d ed. rev. 1987)[hereinafter DSM II-R].
Depression is correlated with a family history of such illness. See, e.g., Elliot J.
Gershon, The Genetics of Affective Disorders,in 2 PSYCHIATRIC UPDATE 434, 43539 (Lester Grinspoon ed., 1983).
Estimates vary widely. For example, some studies suggest that the annual rate of
suicide among depressed patients is 3.5 to 4.5 times that of other psychiatric patients and 22 to 36 times greater than the rate of the general population. Jan
Fawcett et al., Clinical Predictorsof Suicide in Patients with Major Affective
Disorders:A Controlled ProspectiveStudy, 144 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 35, 35 (1987).
One recent, Swedish study challenges this statistic, concluding that inpatients
under 70 with anxiety disorders may face the same risk of suicide as those suffering from depression. Christer Allgulander & Philip W. Lavori, Excess Mortality
Among 3302 Patients With 'Pure'Anxiety Neurosis,48 ARc-nvEs GEN. PsYCHIATRY 599, 599 (1991)[hereinafter 'Pure'Anxiety Neurosis.] Further, the patient is
at equal risk of suicide if the depression stands by itself or represents the depressed phase of bipolar disorder. Suicide is infrequently associated with manic
or hypomanic phases.
Psychotherapy might be supportive, dynamically oriented, or focused. Focused
psychotherapy includes cognitive or interpersonal psychotherapies.
Jonathan M. Himmelhoch, Lest TreatmentAbet Suicide, 48 J.CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 44,45 (Supp. Dec. 1987). Dr. Himmelhoch also cautions physicians that "even
more disconcerting is the occasion in which a properly selected medication abets
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Drug and alcohol abuse and dependence are also associated with
increased risk of suicide. 37 One of the problems is intoxication itself
organically impairs judgment and makes the impulsive development
of a plan almost momentary, placing the patient at greater risk38 and
the treating physician in a position of increased liability.3 9 Combining
the two risk factors of drug and alcohol abuse and dependence and
depression appears to substantially increase the likelihood of suicide.40
Nevertheless, because data show no significant advantage of inpatient
over outpatient treatment of drug and alcohol abuse and dependence,4 1 hospitalization should be reserved for those who fail outpatient treatment, have concomitant diseases which require
hospitalization, or are at definite risk for suicide.
Panic disorder is associated with suicide42 to approximately the
same extent as is depressive disorder.43 Treatment of panic disorder is

37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

suicide through its very efficacy. Elevating a patient's mood from a regressed,
cognitively-disorganized level to one that combines improved cognitive function
with continuing despair provides the patient with both the cause and the capability for self-destruction." 1d. at 45.
See, e.g., Yifrah Kaminer, Psychoactive Substance Abuse and Dependence as a
Risk Factor in Adolescent-Attempted and -Completed Suicide, 1 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 21 (1992); Richard J. Frances et al., Suicide and Alcollism, 13 AM. J.
DRUG ALCOHOL ABuSE 327 (1987); Alex Roy & Mark Ku Linnoila, Alcoholism
and Suicide, 16 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 244 (1986). Criteria for
these diagnoses include recurrent use in hazardous situations, taking more alcohol or drugs over a longer period of time than intended, inability to cut down,
persistent desire, symptoms of intoxication or withdrawal interfering with other
responsibilities, tolerance, reduced occupational or recreational activities, spending much time and effort in obtaining the substance. The first two criteria constitute the syndrome of abuse; the syndrome of dependence is established by
addition of the remaining criteria. DSM III-R, supra note 31, at 167-68, 173-75.
Aaron T. Beck & Robert A. Steer, Clinical Predictorsof Eventual Suicides: A 5to 10-year ProspectiveStudy of Suicide Attempters, 17 J. AFFECTVE DISORDERS
203, 208 (1989). Indeed, "a diagnosis of alcoholism at the time of the index admission increased at least five times the risk for eventual suicide." Id. at 207.
Treatment of these syndromes requires the patient to acknowledge the disease
and abstain from use of the substance. Support of behaviorally-oriented, groupdirected programs fosters continued abstinence.
Frances et al., supra note 37, at 328-30. In fact, 60 to 70 percent of alcoholics have
another recognized psychiatric disorder. Id. at 331.
Richard J. Frances et al., PsychosocialApproaches to Treatment and Rehabilitation, in 8 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 341, 343 (Allan Tasman et al. eds., 1989).
See generally Jan Fawcett, Targeting Treatment in Patients With Mixed Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression, 51 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 40 (Supp. Nov.
1990). According to Dr. Fawcett, "a high level of psychic anxiety was an accurate
predictor of suicide within 1 year of assessment. A measure of severe emotional
pain associated with overwhelming anxiety may thus be a useful indicator of high
suicide risk in patients with major affective disorders." Id. Dr. Fawcett warns
that the first consideration in treating major depression with anxiety is suicide
prevention, and explains that certain drugs have proven effective in relieving
anxiety. Id. at 42.
'Pure'AnxietyNeurosis,supranote 34, at 599. But see Aaron T. Beck et al., Panic
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usually a combination of behavioral psychotherapy and antidepressant
and/or specific anti-anxiety medications. 44
Schizophrenic disorders also correlate with a greater risk of suicide
than found in the general population. 45 Schizoaffective disorders in46
crease the risk of suicide to approximately that of bipolar disorder.
Personality disorders, especially borderline personality disorder or
antisocial personality disorder, are also associated with increased risk
of suicide.47 Suicide or suicide attempts during the course of these disorders are usually impulsive acts, based on acute changes in object relations. Disagreement about treatment programs exists, but most

44.

45.

46.
47.

Disorderand Suicide Ideationand Behavior: DiscrepantFindingsin Psychiatric
Outpatients,148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1195 (1991). This study acknowledged earlier research indicating that those with histories of panic disorder and panic attacks reported more suicidal thoughts, impulses and attempts than those with
other psychiatric diagnoses. However, in the 900 psychiatric outpatients studied,
not one of the 73 with panic disorder without agoraphobia reported attempting
suicide. Only one of 78 patients suffering from panic disorder and agoraphobia
reported a suicide attempt. The study reconfirms the strong connection between
depression and suicide. Id. at 1197. Based on their study of patients at the height
of panic disorder, the authors' study "failed to show any significant previous suicide attempts or any of the indices that would suggest increased risk of suicide in
the future." Id. at 1198. The authors concluded that previous studies suggesting
such a connection "should be viewed as anomalous, warranting further exploration." Id. at 1199.
Jan Fawcett, Predictorsof Early Suicide: Ident(flcation and AppropriateIntervention, 49 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 7, 8 (Supp. Oct. 1988). Symptoms of panic
disorder include discrete periods of intense fear or discomfort with shortness of
breath or smothering sensation; dizziness, faintness, or unsteady feelings; palpitations or tachycardia; trembling or shaking;, sweating, choking- nausea or abdominal distress; depersonalization or derealization; numbness or tingling, flushes or
chills; chest pain or discomfort; nor fear of dying, going crazy or doing something
uncontrolled. DSM llI-R, supra note 31, at 235-39.
Symptoms of schizophrenic disorders include delusions, hallucinations, incoherence, loosening of associations, flat or inappropriate affect, catatonic behavior,
functional impairment in social relations, work, or self care. DSM III-R, supra
note 31, at 187-89.
Schizophrenics are particularly vulnerable to suicide during the early manifestations of symptoms or during those times when they are without hope or social supports. Treatment for schizophrenic disorders generally combines
supportive psychotherapy and environmental management with the use of
neuroleptics.
Schizoaffective syndromes include those in which the symptoms of a major depressive disorder or manic disorder co-exist with those of schizophrenia. Id. at
208-10.
The symptoms necessary to make the diagnosis of borderline disorder include
unstable and intense interpersonal relations, impulsiveness, affective instability,
inability to control angry responses, persistent identity disturbances, feeling of
emptiness or boredom, frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
Symptoms of antisocial disorder include conduct disturbances, inconsistent work
behavior, failure to conform to social norms, irritability and aggressiveness, failure to honor financial obligations, impulsivity, lack of regard for truth, recklessness concerning safety of self or others. Id. at 345-47.
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commentators conclude that the principle focus of treatment should
be some kind of outpatient psychotherapy.48
After making one of these diagnoses, other factors which increase
an individual patient's risk of suicide must be explored. History of a
past suicide attempt is statistically the most valuable of these other
factors.49 Risk of suicide decreases as time since an attempt increases,5 0 but any person who has ever attempted suicide is a greater
risk than one who has not.51 This is true even though studies show
certain people attempt suicide several times.52 These people generally
use methods likely not to be lethal, or choose circumstances where
rescue is probable. 5s3 Nevertheless, individuals in this group do some48. DSM III-R classifies psychiatric diseases on Axis 1; personality disorders are classified on Axis 2. Id. at 10. Medication is used only for those who have an additional psychiatric disease. Tokosz Byran Karasu, Borderline Personality
Disorders,in APA TASK FORCE REPORT ON TREATMENTS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 2749-59 (1989).

49. David A. Brent et al., The Assessment and Treatment of Patientsat Risk for Suicide, in 7 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 353, 357 (Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales
eds., 1988).
50. "A recent suicide attempt requiring medical hospitalization may be considered
prima facie evidence of suicidal risk.... Richard J. Goldberg, The Assessment of
Suicide Risk in the General Hospital,9 GEN. Hosp. PSYCHIATRY 446, 446 (1987).
Nevertheless, Dr. Goldberg recognizes that "the prediction of further suicidal behavior is a very uncertain science." Id.
51. Because of difficulty in obtaining psychological information on suicides, it is common to study those who have attempted suicide. However, because of the common belief that suicide attempters and those who complete suicide actually
represent different kinds of behavior, some question is raised about the validity of
the information. To resolve this dilemma, a group of attempters who ultimately
did commit suicide was studied. Their depression and hopelessness were similar
to those of attempters with the greatest intent to die. The study thus supported
the conclusion that it is possible to extrapolate psychological characteristics of
suicides from studies of attempters. Extrapolation,supra note 13, at 80.
52. One author suggests that attempters and those who succeed are actually "the
same individuals at different points of a developmental continuum." Kenneth S.
Adam, Early Family Influences on Suicidal Behavior, 487 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 63, 63 (1986). Dr. Adam claims that suicidal behavior is a "specific behavioral
response with definable antecedents, an understandable course, and a range of
more or less predictable outcomes." Id.
53. Robert A. Steer et al., Eventual Suicide in Interruptedand UninterruptedAttempters: A Challenge to the Cry-for-Help Hypothesis, 18 SUICIDE AND LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 119, 125 (1988). This study showed differences in precautions taken by interrupted and uninterrupted attempters.
The interrupted attempters took fewer precautions against being discovered, chose less isolated places, and scheduled their attempts at times
when discovery was more likely, whereas the uninterrupted attempters
took more precautions against discovery, chose more isolated places, and
scheduled their attempts at times when discovery was less likely.
Id. at 125. These differences were considered important because interrupted attempters were three times more likely to eventually commit suicide. The authors
concluded that further research is necessary to determine the reasons for this
difference. Id. at 125-26. However, they speculate that one reason might be be-
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times kill themselves,54 perhaps by mistake. Consequently, even people who may seem at less risk because previous attempts did not
5 6
appear serious,5 5 are at greater risk than the general population.
Hopelessness increases risk of suicide in every diagnostic category.
In fact, hopelessness affect has been utilized as a test for suicidality.5 7
Because of the importance of hopelessness,-S one of the major objectives of any psychotherapy of these diseases is reinstilling hope.
A history of suicide in the family is also associated with greater
risk that the person will kill himself.5 9
Another factor increasing the risk is access to means to commit
suicide. Studies suggest decreasing access to lethal means is an effective deterrent, both in individual cases and general populations.
Formulation of a definite plan, while not so extensively studied, is a
sign of the seriousness of risk. Having both a plan and access to means

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

cause interrupted attempters "felt more hopeless after the interruption because
they believe that their problems were still unresolved, or other people may not
have responded to the interrupted attempts as they had before." Id. at 127.
David H. Rosen, The SeriousSuicide Attempt Five-YearFollow-up Study of 886
Patients, 235 JAMA 2105, 2109 (1976). This study confirmed significant differences between serious suicide attempters and those who seemed less serious. Id.
However, the author warned that this does not mean the less serious attempters
can be ignored. "Even though the suicide rate for the serious attempters is significantly higher than that for the nonserious attempters, the actual number of suicides is greaterfor the latter group (23 of 34, or 65% of the total number of
suicides)." Id. at 2109.
One study concluded that the more closely a suicide attempter resembled a suicide "in personal and clinical characteristics as well as in the manner of carrying
out his suicidal act, the higher his risk for a further and fatal suicide attempt."
D.J. Pallis et al., EstimatingSuicide Risk Among Attempted Suicides II. Eficiency of Predictive Scales After the Attempt, 144 BRIT. J. PsYcHIATRY 139, 144
(1984).
In fact, the level of social integration among attempters is consistent with those
who complete the act, and far less than the general population. "[S]uicide attempters are generally not only lonely in the context of family, friends and neighbors, but are also poorly situated with regard to work environment and are
seldom engaged in community events." U. Bille-Brahe & A.G. Wang, Attempted
Suicide in Denmark. II. Social Integration,20 Soc. PsYcHIATRY 163, 170 (1985).
Aaron T. Beck et al., Hopelessness and Suicidal Behavior: An Overview, 234
JAMA 47 (1975); see also Aaron T. Beck et al., Classificationof SuicidalBehavior. I. Quantifying Intent and Medical Lethality, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285
(1975); Aaron T. Beck et al., Assessment of Suicidal Intention: The Scale for Suicide Ideation,47 J. CONSULTING CLNICAL PSYCHOL. 343 (1979); Aaron T. Beck et
al., Hopelessnessand Eventual Suicide: A 10 Year ProspectiveStudy of Patients
Hospitalized with Suicidal Ideation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 559 (1985).
See generallyJ.A.T. Dyer & N. Kreitman, Hopelessness,Depression and Suicidal
Intent in Parasuicide,144 BRIT.J. PSYCHIATRY 127 (1984). This article concluded
that hopelessness is also strongly correlated with suicide attempts.
Hawton, supra note 5, at 149. However, it is not clear whether this is due to
"family predisposition to affective disorder and other conditions, to having a family model of suicidal behavior, or both." Id.
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to implement the plan 6O are probably the two most important factors
in evaluating the risk of suicide.61
Emphasis on careful diagnosis, guidelines for treatment and specific risk factors should improve the quality of patient care. These
medical data may also be used to create a decision tree to assess the
seriousness and immediacy of risk of suicide in a particular patient. In
addition to determining the appropriate treatment for the underlying
illness, this information is critical for deciding the degree of intervention necessary to attempt to prevent suicide. More coercive intervention is justified as the likelihood of suicide increases.
In sum, following his initial determination that the patient is suicidal, the physician must decide if this patient suffers from depression,
bipolar disorder, panic disorder, substance abuse or dependence, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or borderline or antisocial personality. If the patient has one or more of these disorders, the physician
must consider the following factors which are likely to further increase the risk of suicide: hopelessness, existence of a plan, access to
means, previous attempts, concurrence of another illness, and family
history of suicide. Finally, although the physician should use this or a
similar decision-making process, it is important to recognize that even
when major congruences of these factors exist, the physician will predict suicide twenty-five times for every death that will occur.
III.

PHYSICIAN'S OPTIONS

Assuming a treating physician decides, using these or other
predictors, 62 that his patient is suicidal, suicidal thoughts and impulses
60. ROBERT G. MEYER ET AL., LAW FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 39 (1988).
61. Murphy, supra note 6, at 414.
62. See, e.g., William M. Patterson et al., Evaluation of Suicidal Patients: The SAD
PERSONS Scale, 24 PsYcHosoMATics 343 (1983). An "easily learned scale" using
10 major risk factors had a positive influence on the accuracy of predictions by a
control group of medical students. The acronym SAD PERSONS represents the
predictors: 1) sex, 2) age, 3) depression, 4) previous attempt, 5) ethanol abuse,
6) rational thinking loss, 7) social supports lacking, 8) organized plan, 9) no
spouse and 10) sickness. Id. at 345. The psychiatrists who propose this scale recognize that other possible risk factors exist. However, they claim that these other
factors-race, geographic region of residence, religion, occupation, drug abuse, defenselessness, season, and genetic disposition-"are inconsistent, less well documented, and of less practical importance to the average physician who is
evaluating the potentially suicidal patient." Id.
Advocates claim medical students can quickly and easily be taught this SAD
PERSONS scale. Medical students who used the scale during an experiment predicted suicidality with a significantly greater degree of accuracy than the control
group. In fact, they achieved approximately the same accuracy as experienced
psychiatrists. However, while this scale might be useful for medical education, it
apparently neither increases the accuracy of an experienced physician nor helps
protect him from liability for a careful, considered, but incorrect, conclusion.
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are the product of an underlying mental disease, and intervention is
necessary to protect his patient, he still faces additional important decisions. Although he must presently make decisions on appropriate
treatment in the absence of clear medical and legal guidelines,6 3 he
would be liable if a jury decides other physicians would have predicted
and prevented the suicide or attempted suicide. Liability is imposed if
treatment falls below the standard of care for physicians in his specialty.6 4 Deceptively simple, this standard contains two almost-insurmountable, inherent difficulties: 1) predicting whether a particular
patient will kill himself,65 and 2) determining appropriate steps for
preventing suicide.
Presented with a suicidal patient, a physician's possible responses
fall naturally along a continuum from simply continuing treatment for
the underlying disorder to involuntary hospitalization. None of these
options is perfect and, with the exception of merely continuing treatment, each option involves at least some degree of coercion and loss of
personal autonomy. In addition, some require a breach of confidentiality and result in invasion of privacy. Other options impose varying
degrees of restriction on a person's liberty.
Because of the importance of the affected interests-fundamental
rights to privacy, 66 autonomy and liberty-physicians and the legal
system agree: the physician should choose the least restrictive alternative likely to prevent suicide. This means the appropriate treatment
plan depends on the physician's prediction of degree and immediacy of
the patient's risk of suicide. In other words, what is the probability
63. Many people have attempted to isolate or define factors which increase the risk
of suicide. For example, one report establishes a suicide-risk scale for hospitalized adults between the ages of 18 and 70. Jerome A. Motto et al., Developmentof
a Clinical Instrument to Estimate Suicide Risk, 142 AM. J. PsYcHATRY 680, 68586 (1985). Nevertheless, the authors concede that they "never entertained the
idea of an instrument that will predict suicide in individual cases." Id. at 684.
Moreover, the proposed scale is not intended to replace clinical judgment. Where
the two conflict, the clinician should follow his judgment. Id. at 685.
64. Some courts apply a national standard, especially if the physician is a specialist.
See, e.g., Bourne v. Seventh Ward Gen. Hosp., 546 So. 2d 197, 201 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1137-38 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
Other courts only require that physicians meet the standard of care exercised by
doctors in their specialty in the same or similar communities. See, e.g., Farrow v.
Health Serv. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979); Summit Bank v. Panos, 570
N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
65. Predictions of suicidality may be even more difficult, and thus less accurate, than
projections of dangerousness. This is particularly disturbing because physicians
consistently, and almost uniformly, reject the notion that they can predict dangerousness. See, e.g., Bruce Ennis & Thomas R. Litwak, Psychiatryand the Presumption ofExpertise: FlippingCoins in the Courtroom,62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 71116, 732-34 (1974).
66. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
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that, without intervention, the patient will commit suicide within a
short period of time?
How the physician answers this question, and which of the several
treatment options he chooses, have obvious important consequences
for the patient. When the decision is correct, the patient resolves his
problems 6 7 and avoids suicide. On the other hand, a bad choice may
fail to prevent suicide or unnecessarily interfere with the patient's
fundamental rights.
IV.

STANDARD OF CARE FOR LIABILITY

The preferred treatment plan is the least restrictive because as
treatment options become more intrusive, the patient's rights to liberty, privacy and autonomy are increasingly abridged.68 The most obvious individual interest is the life of the patient.69 The interest
apparently belongs to the individual who wants to surrender it, and
ordinarily a person may voluntarily relinquish a right. However,
under certain circumstances the State, acting in its parens patriae role,
may intervene to protect an individual.70 The State could protect the
individual and alleviate concerns about unwarranted legal liability by
protecting a physician from malpractice arising from his patient's suicide, so long as he made good faith treatment decisions following careful consideration of the proposed guidelines. This protection is only
possible, however, if a general standard of care in treating suicidal pa67. In some cases, resolution of the patient's problems might not be possible. Under
these circumstances, by teaching skills to the patient to cope with his problem,
psychiatric treatment may eliminate the wish to commit suicide.
68. Cf. Jennifer E. Bennett Overton, Note, UnansweredImplications - The Clouded
Rights of the Incompetent Patient Under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (1991)[hereinafter Unanswered Implications]. "In constitutional terms, the right to die most often is linked with an
individual's right to personal freedom, self-determination, and privacy." Id. at
1293-94.
69. Government has an interest in "preserving the sanctity of life in general under a
guarantee of the 'right to life.' " A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with
the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 632
(1986)[hereinafter Wrongful Living]. The general response to this argument is
the recognition that" 'individual freedom of choice and conduct'" are fundamental. Id. at 632-33 (quoting In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 n.5 (D.C. 1972)). Moreover, as the patient's "physical condition deteriorates and as the intrusiveness of
the refused treatment increases, the balance shifts toward recognition of the right
to die." Id. at 633.
70. Indeed, several arguments are frequently raised to support intervention to prevent suicide. David F. Greenberg, Involuntary PsychiatricCommitments to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 229-36 (1974). Initial justification based on
religion is less persuasive in a secular society which values freedom of religion.
Current rationalizations for intervention emphasize "the prevention of harm to
survivors, the prevention of harm to the suicide attempter and suicide as the
product of mental illness." Id. at 230.
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tients is established and physicians are aware of, and understand, the
procedure.
Such a standard does not presently exist. It is virtually impossible
to establish whether the reasonable physician could have prevented
suicide because, using even the best indicators,71 physicians' predictions are correct in only one in twenty-five cases. This high error rate,
and the potentially disastrous adverse consequences of an incorrect
decision, place the physician in a difficult situation. 72 Suits for a patient's suicide represent a high percentage of malpractice claims
against psychiatrists, 73 physicians most likely to be treating underlying mental disorders associated with suicide. This means the physician's choice of treatment plan could subject him to years of
litigation,74 loss of his professional license, substantial attorneys' fees,
71. Some physicians recognize similar problems in attempts to apply the general malpractice standard in situations where "reliable, clinically validated paradigms"
for prediction have not been established. Mark J. Mills et al., Protecting Third

Parties. A Decade After Tarasoff,144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 68, 72 (1987)[hereinafter Protecting Third Parties]. Although they raise the issue in the context of
difficulty in predicting dangerousness, similar difficulty in predicting suicide supports an analogous argument.
The authors suggest a "more flexible liability standard: the substantial
departure rule." Id. at 72. The physician would only be liable if he "was acting in
a cavalier or irresponsible fashion" but not if he "chose a course that many,
although not all, reasonable practitioners in similar clinical circumstances would
have chosen." Id. at 73. Because they conclude that issues surrounding predictions of violence "are much more public policy than psychiatry," the authors suggest that appropriate resolution of the issues should be sought through the
judicial system whenever possible. Id. at 72.
72. See, e.g., James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist

or Psychologist for Failure to Take Steps to Prevent Patient's Suicide, 17
A.L.R.4th 1128 (1982).
Attempts to impose liability are probable if treatment fails and a patient commits, or even attempts, suicide. This might, at least partially, explain why physicians typically overpredict suicide.
73. Irwin N. Perr, Court Findingsin Suicide MalpracticeSuits Reveal Inconsistencies, THE PSYCHATRiC TwEs, Nov. 1990, at 32, 32. "Suicide may instigate the
second greatest number of lawsuits brought against psychiatrists." Id. Dr. Perr
cautions that "[the idea that psychiatric or mental health intervention affects the
suicide rate is, to my knowledge, unsubstantiated." Id. at 33. Further, after reviewing 32 lawsuits, he concluded that only 10 percent involved negligence.
Moreover, none of the negligence was failure to predict behavior. "The attempt
to impose responsibility seemed unreasonable in cases arguing that the caretaker
should have anticipated suicide and prevented it.... One cannot prognosticate
accurately in any individual case." Id. at 34.
74. Ironically, this is true both if the physician fails to take sufficient action to prevent suicide or if steps he chooses are subsequently declared too restrictive. Indeed, at least one court found that wrongful initiation of commitment
proceedings could support a claim for malicious prosecution. Pellegrini v. Winter,
476 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Absent some recourse for a person
wrongfully detained for examination, involuntary commitment statutes would be
vulnerable to a due process challenge. Id. at 1366.
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and a large malpractice verdict. The physician who, after a good faith
evaluation of risk of suicide, created and implemented what he believed was the best treatment plan for his patient, could be sued and
lose. Such a result is particularly troubling when viewed in light of
one recently reported eleven-year study of 1906 high risk patients. In
the study, physicians, using commonly accepted predictors, failed to
correctly anticipate even one suicide.75
Despite such overwhelming statistics, the legal system currently
permits liability for failure to accurately predict suicide; a difficult, if
not impossible, determination, verifiable only after it is too late.76
Contrast this with the proposed standard, which attempts to respond
to the difficulty in prediction, requiring only that physicians respond
to those objective, more easily identified and quantified factors they
have been trained to recognize which increase the risk of suicide.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES
Confronted with the suicidal patient, the physician must review
the continuum of options and consider the risk factors, asking himself:
1) will continuing to treat the underlying disease and problem,
only discussing suicidal thoughts and feelings as they occur during
therapy, be sufficient to protect the patient? If not,
2) will closely supervising the patient as an outpatient, possibly
with daily contact, including agreement upon a treatment program involving the ongoing recognition of suicidal impulses be sufficient to
avoid suicide? If not,
3) will alerting family or close friends who may be able to carefully monitor the patient effectively diminish the chance of suicide? If
not,
4) will a partial hospitalization program protect the patient from
his self-destructive thoughts and impulses? If not,
5) will the patient consent to hospitalization? If not,
6) is involuntary hospitalization the only way to prevent suicide?
The proposed guidelines would eliminate, or at least diminish,
problems associated with treating suicidal patients. A physician would
75. See generally Rise B. Goldstein et al., The Prediction of Suicide; Sensitivity,

Specificity, and Predictive Value of a MultivariateModel Applied to Suicide
Among 1906 Patients With Affective Disorders,48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
418 (1991). "The results appear to support the contention that, based on present
knowledge, it is not possible to predict suicide, even among a high-risk group of
inpatients." Id. at 418.
76. Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients, 40 ARCHIVEs
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 257 (1983). "The courts and public opinion seem to expect
physicians to be able to pick out the particular persons who will later commit
suicide. Although we may reconstruct causal chains and motives after the fact,
we do not possess the tools to predict particular suicides before the fact." Id.
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still be liable if he failed to recognize suicidality when other physicians
in his specialty would have predicted it.7 Unlike the present system,
however, the proposal provides the physician with clear guidelines to
decide the critical question of how to treat his suicidal patient.
Another important component of the proposal is redefining negligence in treatment of suicidal patients. The physician would only be
negligent if he failed to carefully consider the proposed guidelines and
did not apply the risk factors in choosing an option.7 8 Thus, because
liability requires negligence, the physician who follows the guidelines
will not be liable even if his patient commits suicide.79
If a patient does kill himself,80 it might appear the physician chose
the wrong option. Nevertheless, judges consistently, and correctly, refuse to impose liability for a mere error in professional judgment 8 l or
77. Nevertheless, liability will not be imposed "merely upon the disagreement of another physician with the manner in which treatment is provided." Krapivka v.
Maimonides Medical Ctr., 501 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (App. Div. 1986).
78. In fact, Congress recently endorsed the development of practice guidelines by
various professional groups. Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can PracticeGuidelines
Reduce the Number and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2856
(1991). The authors acknowledge that guidelines could be important in malpractice cases. However, this is only true if the guidelines are "assumed to be (1) developed for conditions or procedures that frequently lead to events for which
negligence claims are filed; (2) widely accepted in the medical profession;
(3) fully integrated into clinical practice; (4) straightforward and readily interpreted in a litigation setting." Id. at 2858. As a result, the authors caution that
the guidelines' initial impact on the number of malpractice cases filed or settlement amounts received may be small. Id. at 2859.
Relevant, reliable practice parameters are currently generally admissible as
evidence of the appropriate malpractice standard of care. However, courts retain
the right to consider other evidence on the issue, and may even reach conclusions
contrary to those parameters. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should PracticeParameters
Be the Standard of Care in MalpracticeLitigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2886 (1991).
79. It is also important to recognize that family members have a strong motivation to
challenge treatment decisions if the patient kills himself. First, they might feel
guilt for their inability or unwillingness to have helped their relative. Suing the
decedents physician shifts the blame and may alleviate guilt. Margot 0. Knuth,
Civil Liability for Causingor Failing to Prevent Suicide, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
967, 967 (1979). Second, relatives are frequently angry at the decedent because of
the suicide, but cannot permit themselves negative thoughts and feelings toward
him. Instead, they direct their anger toward a more acceptable target-the physician. Third, family members have an obvious financial reason to sue, and a pervasive notion that someone should have to pay for any injury suffered encourages
these suits. Finally, of course, the physician might actually have been negligent.
80. In fact, some physicians contend that it is impossible to prevent certain people
from killing themselves, and that methods necessary to prevent such suicides
might even be harmful. "[Tihe only way to absolutely prevent suicide is to use
four-way restraints on the patient 'with half a dozen people watching every
move.'" Breese v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1098, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Further,
"such excessive restraint is detrimental to an already disturbed patient." Id.
81. See, e.g., White v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Va. 1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d
989 (4th Cir. 1966)(per curiam).
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a bad or undesirable result.82 This is because physicians must be permitted "a wide range of judgment and discretion. They cannot insure
results and cannot be held liable under law for honest errors of judgment made while pursuing methods, courses, procedures and practices
recognized as acceptable by their profession."83
This argument highlights one of the benefits of the proposed standard: it continues to permit the physician a "wide range of judgment
and discretion," while specifically outlining "methods, courses, procedures and practices" which would be acceptable in the profession,
thus, non-negligent. The physician who determines that his patient is
suicidal, and that the suicidal thoughts and impulses are the product of
an underlying mental disorder, is not negligent so long as he considers
and chooses from the continuum of options, beginning with the least
restrictive. He should use sound, medical judgment 4 in choosing the
appropriate treatment plan. In this way, he also assures quality patient care.
The physician should begin his evaluation with a determination of
whether simply continuing treatment of the underlying illness will be
sufficient to protect his patient. Assuming he decides the risk of suicide is too great, he should proceed along the continuum of options,
82. See, e.g., Cohen v. State, 382 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 364 N.E.2d 1134
(N.Y. 1977); Dillmann v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). But
see Baker v. Werner, 654 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1982)(holding that a jury instruction
that "[a] physician... is not negligent merely because he makes a mistake or
error in judgment" is erroneous but harmless where the jury had been properly
instructed on the burden of proof in malpractice cases and had considered the
defendant physician's conduct).
83. Dillmann v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
84. A decision not based on a proper medical foundation, "one which is not the product of a careful examination, is not to be legally insulated as a professional medical judgment." Bell v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 787,
794 (App. Div. 1982). In Bell, a former psychiatric patient sued for injuries sustained in his suicide attempt after his release from a hospital. Referring to the
general refusal to impose liability in the absence of" 'something more'" than an
error of judgment, the court also conceded that " 'the line between medical judgment and deviation from good medical practice is not easy to draw.' " Id. (quoting
Topel v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 431 N.E.2d 293, 295 (N.Y. 1981)). However, the defendant physician's decision to release the patient was made without a
careful examination. He failed to inquire into prior psychiatric history. Further,
the physician recommended release although the patient was experiencing potentially harmful delusions. He did not even investigate the nature of delusions suffered shortly before release. He determined that the patient had stabilized,
despite a need to physically restrain him the day before his release. The evidence
of this egregious negligence sustained the finding that the physician's decision to
release the patient was not a professional judgment based on careful examination, and thus the erroneous judgment could be the basis for liability. Id. at 78996. See also Hirschberg v. State, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Ct. Cl. 1977)(egregious conduct
of physician created liability for failure to make a professional judgment based on
careful examination).
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carefully weighing the risk of suicide against the potential infringement of the patient's constitutional rights. For example, he should
next consider whether the risk of suicide would be sufficiently alleviated by obtaining an agreement from the patient recognizing his suicidal impulses, and then by closely supervising him. While this option
requires curtailment of the patient's autonomy, the restraint is minimal and may be justified by the risk of suicide.
If the physician fears he cannot adequately supervise the patient,
he may decide to alert family or close friends to the suicidal risk. It is
true this option requires a breach of confidentiality85 which may be an
essential part of the physician-patient relationship. However, under
some circumstances a breach of physician-patient confidentiality has
been approved and even required.S6 Although courts have refused to
85. It is interesting to note, by analogy, that the Supreme Court recently decided a
newspaper could be liable for identifying a source in violation of a contract promising confidentiality. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
86. For example, the watershed case of Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of University of
California, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), qff'd in part rev'd in part,551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976), imposed on therapists a duty to warn identifiable third-party victims of
their patients. However, courts consistently refuse to extend this duty to suicidal
patients. Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1978), is illustrative.
Plaintiffs' daughter had been defendant's patient for an unspecified time before
her suicide. Her parents stated a cause of action against her physician by alleging
(1) the existence of psychiatrist-patient relationship, (2) defendant's knowledge
that patient was likely to kill herself because defendant's written notes indicated
plaintiffs' daughter was suicidal, and (3) defendant's failure to take appropriate
preventive steps. Id. at 538. The court held that what constitutes appropriate
treatment is a "purely factual question." Id. The facts did not support imposing
liability on defendant for failing to warn plaintiffs that their daughter was suicidal. The Bellah court said that Tarusoffactually protects against disclosure unless the strong interest in confidentiality is outweighed by some stronger public
interest, such as protecting third parties from violence. Because of the "virtual
necessity" of confidentiality, and because imposition of the duty to warn of
"vague or even specific manifestations of suicidal tendencies... could well inhibit
psychiatric treatment," the court limited the Tarasoffduty to warn to situations
involving danger to a third person. Id. at 539-40.
This limitation is troubling for at least two reasons. First, the problems associated with disclosure are the same whether the patient is a danger to others or is
only a danger to himself. Confidentiality is a "virtual necessity" and disclosure
"could well inhibit psychiatric treatment" in either case. The only real difference
is the interest to be balanced: the life or well-being of a third person compared
with the suicidal person's own life. Making this the critical distinction is disconcerting because it suggests that the system appears to value one life more than
another. The second objection to this distinction is based on its contrast with
most civil commitment statutes. Generally, involuntary commitment may be
sought where the individual is a danger to himself or others. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ch. 394.462 (1991). These statutes appropriately seek to treat and protect if the
patient is dangerous, and are not concerned with whether the victim is a third
person or the patient himself.
Naturally, some differences exist and warning the potential "victim" would be
foolish when the patient is contemplating suicide. He knows he is thinking about
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extend the duty to breach confidentiality to the case of the suicidal
patient,8 7 the option to do so without liability should be available to
the treating physician.8 8 While such a breach does infringe upon an
individual's privacy, and might have adverse consequences, 8 9 it may be
warranted by the risk of suicide. Further, limited disclosure to family
or close friends is preferable to, and might eliminate the need for,
more intrusive treatment options.
In some situations, however, the physician will decide that warning
family or friends would be inadequate to protect his patient. He might
decide his patient requires hospitalization. Partial hospitalization
should be considered first because it is less restrictive to the patient's
liberty than 24-hour inpatient care.
In those cases where partial hospitalization will not be sufficient to
prevent suicide, the physician should attempt to convince his patient
to voluntarily enter a hospital. Voluntary hospitalization is preferable, but, under certain circumstances, only the most restrictive treatment-involuntary hospitalization-may protect the patient.90 The

87.
88.

89.

90.

suicide and thus poses a danger to himself. Even so, it makes sense to provide
physicians with the option of informing family or friends. This breach of confidentiality, which clearly implicates a patient's privacy interest and might inhibit
treatment, could be justified to save his life. Physicians should carefully restrict
the number of people they inform to only those necessary to protect the patient.
See supra note 86.
The law generally imposes an obligation on a physician to warn those who might
protect third parties from his potentially dangerous patients but rejects such a
duty if his patient is suicidal. See supra note 86. This split is ironic because research establishes that the mentally ill are no more likely to be violent than
members of the general public, Protecting Third Parties,supra note 71, at 73,
while the vast majority of suicides are people suffering from mental disorders.
See infra note 202.
But see Lawson R Wulsin et al., Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff
Decision: The TherapeuticAlliance and the "Duty to Warn," 140 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 601 (1983), in which the authors conclude that warning a third party actually
furthered the therapeutic alliance in some cases.
An accurate assessment of whether or not the patient can be helped on
an outpatient basis is of crucial importance. This involves a suicide/
homicide assessment; because of the acute and intense disorganization of
the patient's ego functioning, this can be of real life-and-death importance. This issue must not be minimized by the therapist! All persons
assessed to be a serious threat to themselves or others must be referred
immediately to a psychiatrist for evaluation and possible hospitalization.
This same precaution is necessary if the patient is exhibiting psychotic
behavior according to the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association
1987) definition of the term. Such referral is necessary to protect the
patient when he is unable to protect himself, and to protect the nonphysician therapist from legal liability in a very dangerous situation. Because
of the disruptive effect it has on many people's lives, hospitalization
should be considered very carefully and used only when other methods
of helping the patient are considered ineffective or dangerous.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 3 TREATMENT OF PsYCHIATRIC DIsORDERS:

A TASK FORCE REPORT 2529 (1989).
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patient who has formulated a fully lethal plan and who possesses or
can readily access the means to carry it out should be admitted "forthwith" to a secure psychiatric facility. 91
VI.

PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO COMMIT

The most restrictive alternative-involuntary hospitalization 92 generally has the best chance of preventing suicide. Nevertheless, imposing a general duty to commit suicidal patients is inappropriate for
several reasons. Such intrusive intervention is neither warranted nor
acceptable in many cases because of its enormous intrusion on an individual's privacy, liberty and autonomy. Indeed, some experts suggest
involuntary hospitalization might actually harm certain patients.
They believe freedom to move around9 3 and personal responsibility
improve chances of recovery. 94 Further, they assert "no amount of
security or physical restraint short of rendering the patient unconscious can effectively prevent suicide."9 5 Liability could not be imposed on the physician
each time the prediction of future course of mental disease was wrong, [or]
few releases would ever be made and the hope of recovery of a vast number of
patients would be impeded and frustrated. This is one of the medical and public risks which must be taken on balance
even though it may sometimes result
96
in injury to the patient or others.

Only if the physician is convinced his patient is in serious and imminent danger of suicide can such interference be justified.
Judges appear to recognize these problems and refuse to impose a
legal duty to commit. 9 7 For example, a Florida court recently rejected
the notion that a physician has a duty to commit or assume custodial
91. Murphy, supra note 6, at 414.
92. Ironically, many suggest a psychiatrist should not be liable unless the patient was
under hospital care at the time of suicide or the attempt. Victor E. Schwartz,
Civil Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24
VAND. L. REv. 217, 245-46 (1971). This argument is based on control. Only when
the patient is in a hospital can the physician exercise the type of control and
supervision necessary to prevent suicide.
93. See, e.g., Krupivka v. Maimonides Medical Ctr., 501 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (App. Div.
1986).
94. A trend is discernible which permits physicians and hospitals to risk allowing a
potentially suicidal patient increased freedom. The greater risk is justified because of the potentially therapeutic effects of the freedom. Schwartz, supra note
92, at 249-50.
95. Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445 P.2d 519, 523 (Cal. 1968).
96. Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp. 431 N.Y.S.2d 175,178 (App. Div. 1980)(quoting Taig
v. State, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (App. Div. 1963)).
97. But see All's Well, supranote 9, at 316. "[Flor persons believed to be suicidal, civil
commitment procedures still enjoy support.... Most commitment statutes exercise a form of benevolent coercion designed as such to prevent self-injury by suicide." Id. Statutes frequently specify that the defendant must be dangerous to
himself "if not committed," and be adjudged mentally ill. Id.
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care over his patient. In Paddock v. Chacko,98 the court acknowledged
"some precedent in Florida law for liability predicated upon the negligent failure to safeguard and protect a psychiatric patient with suicidal
tendencies."99 However, the court distinguished those cases because
the patient in each was hospitalized at the time of the suicide or attempt. This was different from Paddock, where the alleged negli10
gence 0 0 was failure to commit a suicidal patient. '
Mrs. Paddock's experts testified that Chacko deviated from the acceptable standard of care by allowing plaintiff to remain with her parents rather than hospitalizing her. 0 2 The appellate court affirmed the
98. Paddock v. Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
99. Id. at 415.
100. Plaintiff also claimed that the physician was negligent because he failed to prescribe the proper amount of medication to prevent the suicide attempt. The court
had little difficulty rejecting this argument, simply stating that expert testimony
did not establish "plaintiff more likely than not would have overcome her suicidal tendencies with a different prescription." Id. at 417. Therefore, failure to
prescribe proper medication was not shown to be the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 418.
101. The facts in Paddock are important. Several days after an initial session with Dr.
Chacko, Linda Paddock attempted to kill herself. She had consulted the psychiatrist while visiting her parents following a previous suicide attempt and brief hospitalization in North Carolina. Dr. Chacko diagnosed her as having a severe
nervous breakdown from which she had substantially recovered. He recommended further psychiatric care either with a psychiatrist in North Carolina, if
she followed through with her intent to return home, or with him if she remained
in the area. After she called her husband, who said he would not or could not
come from North Carolina to get her, she became fearful and anxious. She telephoned Dr. Chacko, and was able to speak with him immediately. She explained
her feelings, admitting she had not been completely truthful during the consultation. Dr. Chacko suggested hospitalization. Mrs. Paddock agreed but asked Dr.
Chacko to speak with her parents first. Her mother talked with the doctor but
said the father made these decisions and he was not available.
Dr. Chacko reserved a bed in a psychiatric hospital for plaintiff. However,
when her father spoke with the doctor later that day, plaintiff's father refused to
consent to hospitalization. Although she was 35 when the incident occurred,
plaintiff testified that her father was a strong authority figure and she did
whatever he said. Id. at 412-13. Plaintiff's father testified that, at the time, he did
not believe his daughter required hospitalization. Indeed, plaintiff's own statement, which was written some two months after the incident and was read to the
jury, was that her father told her-after speaking with Dr. Chacko-that "they
could handle the situation by themselves and he did not think it necessary for her
to go to the hospital." Id. at 413 n.2.
As a result, Dr. Chacko agreed to postpone the hospitalization decision and
increased plaintiff's medicine. He was going out of town for the weekend but said
that he could be reached through his answering service if needed. Plaintiff appeared to be well on Saturday. On Sunday morning, however, she told her father
that she was upset, and had had hallucinations during the night. Nevertheless,
neither she nor her father attempted to contact Dr. Chacko. After her father left
to play golf, Mrs. Paddock went into the woods, made minor cuts on her wrists
and then set her blouse on fire.
102. The jury awarded $2,150,000 in damages for the failure to prevent the suicide
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trial judge's conclusion that:
the law did not impose a legal duty on a psychiatrist to involuntarily take a
patient into his custody; that he was not legally obligated (nor empowered) to
take control of her life away from her against her will to protect1 0her
from her
3
self-destructive tendencies. We agree that no such duty exists.

Seeking alternative theories to establish liability, plaintiff turned
to the state mental health statutes, claiming that the statutes call for
hospitalization of a patient where otherwise "[t]here is a substantial
likelihood... he will cause serious bodily harm to himself."104 The
court also rejected this theory, stating that the statute is permissive
and fails to support an imposition of an affirmative obligation to
hospitalize.
The court did not stop there. It recognized still another problem
with imposing an affirmative duty to commit: a person who improperly commences a civil, involuntary commitment proceeding may be
liable for malicious prosecution. Therefore, imposing liability for failure to involuntarily hospitalize plaintiff, where defendant's advice to
hospitalize was rejected and plaintiff remained in the care of her parents, "would create an intolerable burden on psychiatrists and the
practice of psychiatry."

05

The court said it found no case imposing liability for failure to commit,1 0 6 but a Wisconsin Supreme Court case, decided later the same
year, casts doubt on that statement's continuing validity. In Schuster

v. Altenberg,O7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded plaintiff
could state a cognizable cause of action for failure to seek commit-

ment. To recover, however, plaintiff would have to establish that the
patient met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment.

10

8

A duty to commit appears consistent with the spirit of mental

health acts which provide that danger to self justifies involuntary
commitment. However, imposing such a responsibility on physicians

is contrary to the well-established rejection of such an affirmative
duty found in Paddock and other similar cases. Schuster is distinguishable from suicide cases because the record contained no evidence
the patient took her own life.109 Nevertheless, the relevant dicta 1 is

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

attempt, but the judge granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Id. at 411.
Id. at 412. It is, of course, impossible to determine just how important it was to
the judge that the physician had recommended hospitalization.
Id. at 414-15 n.5 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 394.463 (1985)).
Id. at 415.
Id. at 417. In a footnote, the court effectively distinguished the two cases which
plaintiff claimed supported her claim. Id. at 417 n.9.
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988).
Because the questions were factual, a jury was the proper decision-maker. Id. at
162.
Indeed, the concurring justice seized upon the absence of allegations and facts
establishing suicide to reach the conclusion that the fatal car accident was just
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contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions, and troubling in its potentially far-reaching consequences.
Dr. Altenberg was Edith Schuster's psychiatrist. His alleged negligence 1 1' was failing to seek commitment and to alert the family or
patient about her condition or possible dangerous implications. According to the patient's husband, the physician's alleged negligence led
to Ms. Schuster's death in an automobile accident. Their daughter,
who was a passenger in the car, was paralyzed.l1 2 Decided on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the case provides no facts about the
accident other than that decedent was driving. Nevertheless, the
court used the case to suggest that a physician has a duty to institute
commitment proceedings not only if his patient is a threat to the public but also if the patient is a threat to himself.113 This is because,
according to the court, to the extent expert testimony establishes commitment was the only proper treatment, the suit is simply one for
malpractice.114
In addition to its obvious and direct conflict with the law in other
jurisdictions, Schuster is problematic because of its selective acceptance or rejection of psychiatric research, seemingly based on whether
it is consistent with the court's conclusions. For example, the court
raises an interesting point, but then apparently either fails to understand it, or simply chooses to ignore it. The court acknowledges that
"dangerousness" is a basis for involuntary commitment, but concedes
that holding a psychiatrist liable using "this standard is so plagued
with uncertainty as to be without value [and] would raise 'serious
questions . . as to the entire present basis for commitment procedures.' "115 Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument that this
inherent difficulty in predicting human behavior made imposition of a

110.

111.

that--an accident. Certainly, he opined, a physician should not be liable for the
negligent acts of his patient. Id. at 178 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
The court conceded that Wisconsin law is contrary to most jurisdictions on another important issue. Id at 164. The Schuster court acknowledged that, in most
jurisdictions, unless there is a "readily identifiable victim," a psychiatrist has no
duty to warn third parties that his patient may be dangerous. This analysis is
based on the majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928), which held that such a duty was founded upon the foreseeability of
harm to the person in fact injured. However, Wisconsin adopted the minority
position in Palsgraf, finding negligence where the defendant's act may
foreseeably harm someone. Consequently, a negligent defendant in Wisconsin is
liable for unforeseeable consequences and is also liable to unforeseeable plaintiffs. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Wis. 1988)(citing A.E. Investment v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974)).
Plaintiff also alleged negligent diagnosis and treatment. Schuster v. Altenberg,
424 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Wis. 1988).
Id.
Id. at 170.

112.
113.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 169 (quoting McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (N.J. 1979)).
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duty to commit inappropriate. 16 Without referring to the daunting
number of psychiatrists who vehemently deny the ability to predict
dangerousness, and studies which consistently illustrate the inaccuracy of such predictions, the court says "'assessing dangerousness is
not.., beyond the competence of individual therapists.' "117 By its
simple assertion, 18 the court discounts problems associated with predicting dangerousness.3 9 The court is correct that one survey of
psychotherapists suggests "practitioners are quite confident of their
ability to assess dangerousness,"' 2 0 but a plethora of contradictory
data is simply disregarded. While the court's discussion focused on
dangerousness to others, predicting dangerousness to self is at least as
difficult.121
116. It is interesting to note that a Florida appellate court recently adopted this analysis to reject imposing a Tarasoffduty to warn on psychiatrists whose patients may
be dangerous to themselves or others. In Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(en banc), defendant's patient shot and killed the victim.
Although decedent's family was unable to obtain defendant's records, and thus
could not allege specific threats made by his patient to defendant, the complaint
stated that the doctor knew or should have known of such threats to harm the
victim. The majority refused to impose a duty to warn on psychiatrists because it
"would require the psychiatrist to foresee a harm which may or may not be foreseeable, depending on the clarity of his crystal ball. Because of the inherent difficulties psychiatrists face in predicting a patient's dangerousness, psychiatrists
cannot be charged with accurately making those predictions and with sharing
those predictions with others." Id. at 450. Imposing a duty to warn and protect
would be "fundamentally unfair" because "such predictions are fraught with uncertainty." Id. at 451.
117. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159,169 (Wis. 1988)(quoting Daniel J. Givelber
et al., Tarasoff Myth and Reality:An EmpiricalStudy of PrivateLaw in Action,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 443, 486).
118. The dissent in Boynton also almost blithely dismisses this concern as "without
foundation." Id. at 453 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting). Judge Schwartz contends
that the majority's "self-created fear" should be laid to rest because liability will
be "imposed only when, on the basis of professional standards, the psychiatrist
actually knows or should know that the threat is a viable one." Id. Unfortunately, Judge Schwartz seems to have missed the point. Professional standards
are of little or no assistance in actually determining whether a particular patient's
threat is viable.
119. Acknowledging the existence of much research suggesting severe limitations on
predicting dangerousness, one study suggests there is greater reliability and validity in short-term predictions of the risk of violence among acutely disturbed inpatients. See generally Dale E. McNiel & Ren~e L. Binder, ClinicalAssessment of
the Risk of Violence Among PsychiatricInpatients, 148 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 1317
(1991).
120. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Wis. 1988).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 7-13. The additional public policy argument
based on the importance of confidentiality in the patient-therapist relationship is
raised. Nevertheless, the court correctly decided the law and the physician's ethical code recognize that the protection of the public or the patient may outweigh
the patient's interest in confidentiality. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159,
170 (Wis. 1988).
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Finally, the Schuster court exhibits troubling naivete, or stunning
dishonesty, when it states "mere initiation of detention or commitment proceedings does not threaten the patient's constitutionally protected liberty."12 2 Certainly, as the court said, "a constitutionally
proper procedure" must be followed. But can the court seriously believe liberty, as well as other fundamental rights it fails to even mention, are not threatened by the "mere initiation" of the action?
Imposing a duty to involuntarily commit is troubling for an additional reason. Some experts suggest certain patients cannot be deterred from killing themselves and the extreme steps necessary to
attempt to prevent suicide may actually injure patients. In Bates v.
Denney,i 23 for example, one psychiatrist defendant testified that he
believed involuntary commitment could be "counterproductive." 4
After reviewing the extensive expert testimony presented by both
sides concerning the issue of whether failure to involuntarily commit
is actionable negligence, the court refused to disturb the jury verdict
for defendants.125
In other words, despite the emergency room patient's history of
mental illness and recent hospitalizations for two previous suicide attempts, the court concluded that no clear, affirmative duty to commit
existed. 26 Expert testimony persuaded the court that involuntary
commitment might have made the decedent "less treatable."' 2 7 The
court held that the defendant was not negligent in releasing the patient because: 1) the decedent had been resistant during previous hospitalization, and probably would have been the same this time, 2) the
decedent could not "be hospitalized forever," and 3) even hospitalization is "no guarantee" suicide will be avoided.'28
The Fourth Circuit also recently grappled with the parameters of
the physician's duty to prevent his patient's suicide.' 29 State statutes
prevented a physician from seeking involuntary commitment if the
patient agreed to voluntary hospitalization. As a result, the case might
have limited value but for the court's refusal to hide behind these statutes. Rather, it concluded that the limits of the physician's duty are
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.

129.

Id. at 175.
Bates v. Denney, 563 So. 2d 298 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 301.
Jurors "obviously resolved the. conflicting testimony in favor of defendants....
[Such findings were not] manifest error." Id. at 303.
Before the patient left the hospital, defendant did make an appointment for the
following morning, but the patient committed suicide before the appointment.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 303.
Id. Actually, however, the primary reason defendant escaped liability may have
been the fact that decedent denied suicidal ideation. Defendant concluded he was
"not acutely suicidal... [and] potentially suicidal patients who are not acutely
suicidal are often treated outside the hospital." Id.
Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1990).

SUICIDE

1992]

"not wholly defined" by the constraints of the involuntary commitment statutes.
On the other hand, the court did reject the assertion by decedent's
relatives that "physicians have an unbounded duty to take whatever
other action is humanly possible to ensure that the patient will actually follow through on a competently expressed willingness and intention to commit voluntarily." 3 0 The court correctly surmised such a
duty might require a physician either to obtain "physical custody of
the patient or, at the very least, [maintain] such continuous and close
physical surveillance that effective physical intervention could occur
at any time."'3 ' The importance of a patient's privacy and dignitary
rights outweigh the physician's professional judgments about the "best
132
interest" of his patient.
VII. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEMi33
The current malpractice system, which provides little guidance or
comfort to the physician, also fails to meet the needs of potential
plaintiffs in suicide cases. Several problems with the system combine
to make the outcome in most of these cases neither predictable nor
even equitable.iu
A.

Proximate Cause

Plaintiffs who meet the first malpractice hurdle by establishing the
physician was negligent face yet another major obstacle: the difficult
task of proving the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
One recent study matched the medical records of a random sample of 31,429
patients with statewide data on medical malpractice claims. A. Russell Localio et
al., Relation Between MalpracticeClaims andAdverse Events Due to Negligence,
325 NEw ENG. J. IVIED. 245 (1991). The conclusions were troubling. First, the
results establish that civil litigation "only infrequently compensates injured
patients." Id. at 250. Even more distressing, however, is the conclusion that the
system "rarely identifies and holds health care providers accountable for
substandard medical care." Id. The authors concede that the current malpractice
system fails to achieve its two primary objectives, but "unless credible systems
and procedures, supported by the public, are instituted to guarantee professional
accountability" no changes will be made. Id.
134. See generally Barry Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposalforthe Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 D.U. L. REv. 391
(1978) (suggesting that strict liability should apply as the standard of liability for
defective mental treatment). "Due to its doctrinal and practical limitations, negligence doctrine has unquestionably failed to offer the psychiatric patient a viable
means of recovery. Nor has self-regulation by the profession provided adequate
control over the quality of psychiatric care." Id. at 434.
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the suicide.1 35 The physician's negligence is only the proximate cause
where the ultimate injury is foreseeable as a "natural and probable
consequence of an act or omission." 3 6 The "controlling factor... is
whether the defendants reasonably should have anticipated the danger that the deceased would attempt to harm himself."3 7 Courts generally agree that "[m]aking a physician's duty to guard against a
suicide conditional on its foreseeability is a prudent rule,"1 38 but application of this "prudent rule" is difficult. Whether any particular patient will commit suicide simply cannot be accurately predicted. 3 9
An additional problem plaintiffs encounter when attempting to establish physician's negligence as the proximate cause of the suicide is
distance in time between the negligent act and the suicide. As with
other issues in this quagmire of proximate cause, this is a fact question. This means outcomes are unpredictable and a plaintiff's lawyer
will not be able to confidently advise his client on what legal action, if
any, is appropriate. Just a few examples should suffice.
The Fourth Circuit decided that, as a matter of law, the physician's
care prior to a suicide attempt could not be the legal cause of his patient's suicide nine days later.140 The court noted that the physician's
care might have been "a cause-in-fact of the suicide.., as undoubtedly
were many other factual causes."'4' Nevertheless, it was not "sufficiently 'substantial' to warrant imposing liability upon the actor."' 42
The court recognized that many factors contribute to suicide. Even
when only nine days had passed since the negligence, these other factors had the opportunity to contribute to the suicide, thus preventing a
finding of proximate cause.
In another case, a Tennessee court refused to find that the physi135. Nieves v. City of New York, 458 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 1983). The court unanimously reversed a $194,000 verdict for a suicide which occurred one month after
decedent's discharge from a hospital where he had been treated for a self-inflicted stab wound. During his five-day hospital stay, he was seen twice by a psychiatrist.

The psychiatrist

rejected decedent's claim

that his injury was

accidental but released him because he was "alert, rational and cooperative." Id.
at 548. Plaintiff's expert testified that the suicide "'could have been' a result of
the decedent's discharge, and that it was 'possible' that had he received treatment
he would not have taken his own life." Id. at 548-49. Nevertheless, the court
found, even assuming negligence in discharging the decedent without treatment,

plaintiff failed to prove the negligence was the proximate cause of the suicide. Id.
at 548.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Summit Bank v. Panos, 570 N.E.2d 960, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968).
Fernandez v. Baruch, 244 A.2d 109, 112 (N.J. 1968)(per curiam).
Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So. 2d 841, 845 (Ala. 1988).
"The concept of 'due care' in evaluating psychiatric problems must take into account the inevitable difficulty in reaching a definite diagnosis." Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).

140. Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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cian's alleged negligence in failing to commit decedent was the proximate cause of his suicide seventeen days later.143 Because there was
sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the defendant did
not meet the requisite standard of care, the court assumed the treatment was negligent. 144 Nevertheless, due to the absence of evidence
that decedent was "in such a state of anxiety or depression that he did
not know what he was doing" and the "overwhelming evidence ...
[that during this time he] functioned normally and lived an unremarkable life,"145 the physician's negligence was not the proximate cause of

the suicide.
46
Contrast the cases above with Naidu v. Laird,1
where the court
upheld a finding that the physician's negligence in releasing his patient five and one-half months prior to the injury was the proximate
cause of that injury.14 7 The court rejected the argument "that remoteness in time or space indicates the likelihood that intervening causes
have prevented defendant's acts from being proximate causes of the
harm."148 Acknowledging that lapse of time may be a factor to consider, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded "it is not controlling in
the absence of any evidence that Putney's [the former patient] conduct
was influenced by some unrelated and independent factor which
broke the chain of causation." 149 However, attributing much importance to this decision may be a mistake. Because dangerousness is
overdetermined, presumably a skillful advocate could have discovered
many factors which impacted on the suicidal person in five and onehalf months and could have "broke[n] the chain of causation."' 5 0 Indeed, the court almost seems to make this argument by its pointed
reference to "the absence of any evidence." Arguably, therefore,
Naidu is merely an example of bad lawyering.
Despite aberrant cases such as Naidu, and because of the difficulty
frequently encountered in establishing that the physician's negligence
was the proximate cause of injury, 5 1 the causation requirement has
been relaxed in some malpractice cases where the physician's failure
to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm. 52 A plaintiff
need not prove "'a patient would have survived if proper treatment
had been given, but only that there would have been a chance of sur143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 79.
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).
Although the injury in Naidu was to a third person, the court's reasoning on the
issue of timing is applicable to suicide.
148. Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Del. 1988).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, eg., Nieves v. City of New York, 458 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 1983).
152. RESTATELiENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 323(a)(1964).
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The concurring judge in Gaido v. Weiser15 4 unsuccessfully
proposed expanding this "lost chance of survival" theory to a malpractice case involving suicide. Plaintiff had argued her husband died because his mental illness impaired his judgment. She further stated
that the defendant physician had a duty to treat the decedent's condition-that he was suicidal. This condition involved a grave risk of
harm but proper treatment might have reduced or eliminated the risk.
Failure to properly treat decedent might have increased the risk of
suicide, which could have been "a substantial factor in the chain of
55
causation" in the suicide.

vival.'

B.

"153

Suicide as an Intentional Act

Another problem plaintiffs encounter when attempting to impose
liability on physicians for their patients' suicides is that generally an
intentional act absolves a previously negligent actor from liability for
his negligence.-56 This means that his patient's intentional act of suicide presumably should shield even the negligent physician from malpractice liability. But, where an intentional act-such as suicide-is a
predictable result of a person's negligence, that act is not a supervening cause which breaks the chain of causation and protects the
physician from liability for his negligence. This conclusion led one
psychiatrist to object that "bizarre trends" make it necessary to pay
"some attention . . .to a problem in which one person or group is
charged with liability for the poorly predictable acts of another."'157
In fact, the general rule that an intentional or voluntary act protects a person from liability for his negligence is not absolute. Judges
use different language and legal theories to avoid the general rule in
suicide cases, but rely on one of two basic exceptions: 1) the patient
did not understand what he was doing, or 2) because of the nature of
the doctor-patient relationship and the illness for which treatment is
sought, the duty of the physician to use reasonable care to protect his
patient 5 8 encompasses the patient's duty to care for himself.
153. Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hasp., 563 So. 2d 233, 238 (La. 1990)(quoting Hastings
v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713, 720 (La. 1986)).
154. Gaido v. Weiser, 558 A.2d 845 (1989). Based on the failure to find "plain error,"
the majority opinion simply affirmed the judgment for the defendant on procedural grounds without even reviewing the substantive issues. Id. at 845.
155. Id. at 847 (Handler, J., concurring). Although convinced that the evidence was
adequate to support a jury instruction concerning "whether plaintiff proved,
within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that defendant's failure to
render proper treatment increased plaintiff's [sic] risk of suicide," the judge concurred in the judgment for defendant. Id. The failure to give this instruction was
not "sufficient to satisfy the strict standard of the plain error rule." Id. at 848.
156. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 217.
157. Irwin Perr, Liabilityof Hospital and Psychiatristin Suicides, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 631 (1965).

158. Usually the physician-patient relationship is sufficient to establish this duty, but
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The first exception seems obvious. If the patient did not understand what he was doing when he killed himself, suicide is neither a
voluntary nor intentional act. Therefore, the general rule that an intentional act intervenes to protect the negligent physician simply does
not apply. Further, combining the prediction that the patient was suicidal with the fact that he did not know what he was doing makes
suicide a foreseeable consequence of, and thus proximately caused by,
the physician's negligence. "[A]n act of suicide breaks the chain of
causation unless the decedent's reason and memory were so far obscured that he did not know and understand what he was doing and
was not therefore a responsible human agency."1 59

While several cases' 60 discuss this exception, courts seem reluctant
to allow a decision to turn on the conclusion that the patient did not
know what he was doing. In Weathers v. Pilkinton,16 ' for example,
the spouse's wrongful death claim was rejected because the court
not always. For example, one therapist's "minimum personal contacts... especially in view of the outpatient character of [the therapist-patient] relationship"
did not establish the special relationship necessary to impose liability for the patient's subsequent suicide. King v. Smith, 539 So. 2d 262, 264 (Ala. 1989). Following a significant behavioral change, decedent became violent and abusive,
threatening to kill himself and his family. He was involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric hospital, where Dr. Smith conducted the initial evaluation. The patient was diagnosed as suffering from alcohol abuse and mild mental impairment.
Following further evaluation by other doctors at the hospital, decedent attended
six voluntary outpatient sessions. Although defendant supervised the program, a
trained counselor actually conducted the sessions.
After another violent episode and suicide attempt, decedent was again hospitalized. This time he was evaluated by other staff doctors, who found him to be
suffering from alcohol and substance abuse as well as a mixed personality disorder.
Following his release, decedent attended six more outpatient counseling sessions. Approximately three months later, he killed his two daughters and himself. The court said that the murders and suicide are "tragic in the extreme," but
that Dr. Smith was not liable "because the facts fail to show a special relationship
or circumstance that would make the therapist liable." Id. at 264.
A doctor who evaluated decedent during both hospitalizations recommended
he be released. He concluded that decedent "was a dangerous man with an antisocial personality, but that he was not s74ffeing from a mental illness." Id. at
264. This physician's conclusion supports the notion that a doctor's only role is to
treat underlying illness. Absent such an illness, the patient must be released.
The King court never had to decide this particular issue, however, as plaintiff
inexplicably failed to file a timely appeal against all defendants except Dr. Smith.
159. Weathers v. Pilklnton, 754 S.W.2d 75,78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)(citing Lancaster v.
Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217,222 (Tenn. 1965)). The court reviewed the law of several
other jurisdictions before reaching its conclusion.
160. See, e.g., Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943, 951-52 (Okla. 1973); Lancaster v. Montesi,
390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965); Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 77-78
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
161. The court acknowledged plaintiff was required to establish defendant's negligence as the proximate cause of the suicide. It also recognized foreseeability is
the basis of probable cause, and conceded mentally ill people are more likely than
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found decedent knew what he was doing when he killed himself. Decedent would not have had a cause of action against the physician for
his own voluntary act. As a result, his spouse had no claim.162

Although the court conceded that the jury could have found the doctor was negligent, the alleged negligence was not the proximate cause
of the decedent's death. Rather, the suicide163 "[was], as a matter of
law, an intervening independent cause." 64
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also flirted with the first exception in a wrongful death action based on a drug overdose. The defendant physician prescribed dangerous substances in excessive amounts to
an uneducated teenaged patient who was a known drug addict in
Argus v. Scheppegrell.165 The physician knew his patient was "seriously addicted" and in danger of adverse physical reactions. He also
was aware that accidental or voluntary overdoses could be fatal. Nevertheless, he prescribed drugs in increasing amounts even after a
promise to the patient's mother that he would stop prescribing for her
daughter.166 Expert medical testimony established that one of the
prescribed drugs might alter consciousness so the patient would be unable to judge how much medication she had already taken. Therefore,
it was impossible to prove whether the death was an accident or a suicide. Proof of suicide was essential to the defendant's case because the
lower courts had concluded the doctor should not be liable despite his
obvious "misconduct,"67 if decedent knowingly took an overdose. 168
The supreme court agreed, implicitly approving liability if side effects
of the drug interfered with decedent's ability to know what she was
doing. Because the record contained conflicting evidence on whether
the overdose was deliberate, and an accidental overdose was equally
likely, the defendant failed to prove that decedent committed suicide.' 6 9 Therefore, the defendant was not insulated from liability for
members of the general population to commit suicide as a result of negligent in-

jury. Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
162. Id.
163. At least one court would relieve the physician of liability "'even though the

choice is determined by a disordered mind."' Id. (quoting Daniels v. New York
N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903)). This conclusion goes beyond the proposal suggested in this article. Recognizing the difficulty in deciding whether dece-

164.
165.
166.
167.

dent understood what he was doing, this article suggests that suicide acts as an
intervening circumstance only if suicidal thoughts and impulses were not a product of an underlying disease.
Id.
Argus v. Scheppegrell, 472 So. 2d 573, 576 (La. 1985).
Id. at 576.
Defendant conceded misconduct and admitted he had no defense. As a matter of
fact, the defendant spent time in prison for similar misconduct in prescribing
drugs. Further, the appellate court said the doctor's explanation was "'not just

incredible,'" but was "'ridiculous.'"
168. Id. at 576 n.6.
169. Id.

Id. at 576 n.5.
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his negligence.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana court actually decided the case based
on a variation of the second exception, focusing on the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship and the decedent's specific illness. The
court found the physician liable for several reasons: disparity of positions between doctor and patient, risk of harm from breach of the physician's duty, and the fact that the duty arose "to protect the victim
against the risk of his own negligence."170 This meant that the physician "could only fulfill his duty to his patient by not giving her further
prescriptions for drugs." 171
The New Jersey Supreme Court used the second exception to impose liability on a physician for his patient's suicide attempt in Cowan
72
v. Doering.1
Plaintiff was hospitalized following a second, unsuccessful suicide attempt. Shortly after her admission, plaintiff jumped
from her window, sustaining serious, permanent injury. The court
concluded that a person is excused from exercising reasonable selfcare when that duty is encompassed in the duty owed to plaintiff by
the defendant.173 The defendants were aware of the plaintiff's "propensity for self-damaging acts"174 and her history of suicide attempts
and, because of their medical training, should have understood her
personality disorder. Therefore, they had a "professional responsibility to treat her for this disorder and to treat her for the manifestations
or symptoms of the disorder, namely, suicidal or other self-harmful
acts."

1 7

5

This case is particularly important because the court correctly recognized that the physician's primary role is to treat disease. In addition, the judges were aware suicidal thoughts and impulses are
"manifestations or symptoms of the disorder"176 the physician must
address. If the reasonable physician would have recognized the risk,
based on the patient's condition, and prevented the suicide, the defendant would be liable for failing to do so. Although a psychiatrist is
not "an insurer... bound to prevent suicide,"'17 7 he is not protected
from liability for his own negligence. Further, the physician is not
automatically absolved from liability merely because suicide, or attempts, are intentional. 7 8
Interestingly, both exceptions are used by the Weathers dissent,
170. Id. at 577.
171. Id.
172. Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159 (N.J. 1988). This case was relied on by the dissent
in Weathers.
173. Id at 163.
174. Id. at 165.
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id.
177. Farrow v. Health Serv. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979).
178. Ird
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although again in slightly different technical forms.179 Citing New
YorklSO and New Jerseyl'8 cases, Judge Tatum argued the history of
previous suicide attempts provided "circumstantial evidence sufficient
to make a jury question whether the suicide was committed by 'intelligent power of choice' or by compulsion due to mental illness."1 8 2 The
judge analogized this to the test for insanity in criminal cases. Even if
a criminal defendant knows his conduct is wrong, he presents a valid
insanity defense if he lacks the capacity to "'conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.' "183 Unfortunately, the dissent's argument
is less persuasive than it might seem at first blush because this voli84
tional prong of the insanity defense generally has been rejected.

Nevertheless, this argument, although flawed, has not totally missed
the point. Indeed, under most circumstances-whether criminal or
civil-the mentally ill person, rather than his physician, is, and should
be, responsible for his acts. 8 5
179. Another theory raised to attempt to impose liability on the treating physician is
res ipsa loquitur. However, res ipsa is inappropriate because it requires that,
although no direct evidence of negligence exists, the injury generally would not
occur without negligence. Where res ipsa is appropriate it is used to shift the
burden to defendant to rebut the inference of negligence res ipsa creates. Ray v.
Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1981). However, the evidence in Ray justified the jury's conclusion that neither defendant physician nor
hospital was negligent when decedent drowned in a hospital bathtub, apparently
attempting to prove he could breathe under water.
The Ray court recognized the problem common to these cases. According to
expert testimony, there was no reasonable way to foresee the suicide or to alter
the treatment plan. Even though plaintiff argued defendants' negligence was the
most plausible proximate cause of the suicide, the court said decedent's "death
was unforeseeable and unpredictable." Id. at 1135.
Defendant psychiatrist who admitted decedent to the hospital diagnosed him
as a delusional and paranoid schizophrenic. In his testimony, the physician explained problems associated with treating delusional patients. "[Tihere is no way
we can take precautions for every possible delusion that a person might have
because then we would probably have to keep the person asleep or something....
The delusions do not remain static of the same type, but they vary ....
Id.
180. Bell v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 1982).
181. Cowan v. Doering, 522 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 545 A.2d
159 (N.J. 1988).
182. Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)(Tatum, J.,
dissenting).
183. Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977)).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 323 (1984). "[W]e conclude that the volitional prong of the insanity defense-a lack of capacity to conform one's conduct to the requirements
of the law-does not comport with current medical and scientific knowledge,
which has retreated from its earlier, sanguine expectations." Id. at 248.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 contained the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, and narrowed the insanity defense by eliminating the
volitional prong of the insanity defense. United States v. Lakey, 610 F. Supp. 210,
212 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
185. McNamara v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1989). "Mentally ill people who
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The dissenting judge is more convincing when, agreeing with
Cowan, he argues that a suicidal patient should not be judged by the
same standards as those applied to an adult not suffering from mental
illness. However, rather than continuing to focus on the issue of decedent's awareness, the dissent switched to the second exception to support his conclusion.
Where it is reasonably foreseeable that a patient by reason of his mental or
emotional illness may attempt to injure himself, those in charge of his care
owe a duty to safeguard him from his self-damaging potential. This duty contemplates the reasonably forseeable (sic) occurrence of self-inflicted injury regardless of whether it is the product of the patient's volitional or negligent
1 86
act.

Using this analysis, whether decedent's suicide was intentional is no
longer important. Instead, the critical issue is that the suicide was
"specifically the ailment which the defendant was entrusted to
treat."1 8 7 Although this analysis has merit, the dissenting judge is
technically incorrect here too. Suicide is not "the ailment," but a complication of the underlying mental disorder the physician is treating.
Suicidal thoughts and impulses may be manifestations of an underlying disorder or simply a product of despair associated with some illness. This means that the physician should be liable only if he
negligently treats the underlying disorder, or if he fails to appropriately respond to any symptom of that disease, including suicidal
thoughts and impulses. The physician's primary obligation is to attempt to "cure" his patient's illness. As with other diseases, 88 once
the illness is eliminated, its manifestations, such as suicidal thoughts
and impulses, also may disappear.1 89

186.
187.
188.
189.

are capable of forming an intent and who actually do intend an act that causes
damage will be held liable for that damage." Id. at 146 (quoting McGuire v. Almy,
8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937)). It follows that a mentally ill person can be comparatively negligent in some circumstances. This was a case of first impression
for the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
We join a number of courts in holding there can be no comparative negligence where the defendant's duty of care includes preventing the selfabusive or self-destructive acts that caused the plaintiff's injury.
Clearly, the duty of care that the defendants owed to an institutionalized
patient such as Karen McNamara included taking reasonable steps to
prevent her suicide when it was a known or foreseeable risk. To allow
the defense of comparative negligence in these circumstances would
render meaningless the duty of the hospital to act reasonably in protecting the patient against self-harm.
Id. at 146-47 (citations omitted).
Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Cowan v.
Doering, 522 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)).
Id. at 81.
For example, the pain of a strep throat vanishes if penicillin destroys the streptococci which caused it.
Nevertheless, it has been asserted that suicide does not "seem to be simply a
symptom of an underlying diagnostic condition that goes away if the condition
responds to treatment.... [A]ssigning to a patient a diagnosis that has a high risk
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Certainly, a real risk of suicide cannot be ignored. However, because behavior is so unpredictable,190 especially in cases of suicide, attempts to impose liability for anything other than failure to do that for
which physicians are trained-treating the underlying disease under
medical guidelines and identifying potential suicide risks-is
inappropriate.
C.

Contributory Negligence as an Affirmative Defense

The Cowan court, in dicta, explained that, had the issue been
before it, it would have rejected the defendants' affirmative defense of
contributory negligence because its application to a disturbed plaintiff
requires consideration of his capacity. This flexible standard, which
recognizes that a particular plaintiff may not be capable of adhering to
a reasonable person's standard of self-care, only holds the patient responsible for any conduct which, based on his capacity, is unreasonable. However, despite its refusal to allow contributory negligence as a
defense, the Cowan court considered plaintiff's conduct in deciding
proximate cause, thereby actually returning to the general rule. If a
particular result is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence, even the plaintiff's voluntary acts are not an intervening cause
which break the chain of causation. Where the plaintiff was mentally
disturbed, and her suicidal thoughts and impulses were symptomatic
of her condition, the defendants' duty was to prevent her from harming herself. Because this duty of care included preventing the kinds of
acts that caused the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff's actions and capacity were subsumed within the defendants' duty.' 9 ' Permitting contributory negligence would "'render meaningless the duty of the
hospital to protect the patient against self-inflicted harm.' "192
A similar argument was recently raised in Bramlette v. CharterMedical Columbia. 93 The decedent committed suicide following the
defendant physician's alleged negligence.J 94 The defendant argued

190.

191.
192.
193.
194.

of suicide is not in itself an explanation for suicide." Herbert Hendin, Psychodynamics of Suicide With ParticularReference to the Young, 148 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 1150, 1150 (1991).
See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)("Psychiatry is not, however, an
exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnoses to be attached to given behavior
and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on the likelihood of future
dangerousness.")
Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 166-67 (N.J. 1988).
Id. at 167 (quoting Cowan v. Doering, 522 A.2d 444, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987)).
Bramlette v. Charter-Medical Columbia, 393 S.E.2d 914 (S.C. 1990).
Expert testimony indicated that the physician defendant had deviated from acceptable medical practice in several ways:
failing to get a complete history from the family; failing to order more
intense supervision for the first seven to ten days after admission; failing
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that the decedent "was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk as
a matter of law because he was not insane and therefore acted knowingly when he killed himself."195 The Bramlette court neatly sidestepped the issue of decedent's sanity 9 6 by focusing on the duty owed
by a treating physician "to prevent a known suicidal patient from committing suicide."197 Agreeing with the Cowan majority, the court concluded that "the very act which the defendant has a duty to prevent
cannot constitute contributory negligence or assumption of the risk as
a matter of law." 98
Nevertheless, some courts argue "a mentally disturbed" person
might be capable of contributory negligence. For example, in Biundo
v. Christ Community Hospital,199 a physician operated on a patient
whose body was discovered under his hospital window four days after
the procedure. The plaintiff, decedent's widow, claimed that the decedent either jumped or fell because of the pain from the surgery, and
that the defendant was negligent in not recognizing the risk of suicide.
However, based on unchallenged expert medical testimony that the
defendant used reasonable skill for a neurosurgeon, the court upheld a
directed verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's objection to the
jury instructions regarding contributory negligence was rejected.
"Whether or not a mentally disturbed person is capable of contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury where, as here, decedent was never found mentally ill or incapacitated."2 00 Thus the court
implied that, under some circumstances, a disturbed individual may be
found contributorily negligent.
VIII. TREATING THE PATIENT
Despite the potentially high cost of protection to the suicidal patient-a price exacted not only in money and risk to life but also in
loss of personal autonomy, liberty and privacy-intervention to prevent suicide is permissible because most judges and legislators agree
preserving life satisfies the requisite compelling state interest. The
underlying hypothesis is a person who commits suicide acts contrary

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

to prohibit an outing off hospital grounds; failing to diagnose Bramlette
as a high risk for suicide based on his anxiety attacks and his unrealistic
improvement immediately upon admission to the hospital.
Id. at 916. Additional testimony established that a patient is at greater risk of
suicide in the few days following admission to the hospital. As a result, "extreme
vigilance is required during the initial seven to ten day period to allow the medication and therapy to begin to take effect." Id.
Id. at 917.
See supra note 184.
Bramlette v. Charter-Medical Columbia, 393 S.E.2d 914, 917 (S.C. 1990).
Id.
Biundo v. Christ Community Hosp., 432 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 1297.
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to his interests and needs someone to protect him from himself.201 At
least implicit in this hypothesis is the belief that by attempting, threatening or, perhaps, even contemplating suicide, the suicidal person exhibits an inability to make such an irrevocable decision. This
hypothesis as an absolute is untenable because some suicides occur
without a demonstrable mental disorder.2 02 The argument is only persuasive when the suicidal thoughts and impulses are the product of an
underlying mental illness and, thus, the patient's idea to end his life is
not something he decided20 but rather a result of a psychiatric disorder. 204 Even so, this second argument is troubling, as it seems to support a form of quasi-incompetency. In other words, without a
finding-with all its concomitant substantive and procedural rightsof incompetency, 205 the physician decides his patient is not capable of
making decisions for himself.2 06 As the result of this conclusion, the
physician makes important choices, with potentially serious adverse
consequences, for his patient. When made without the patient's consent, these choices are particularly problematic. Indeed, a physician
ordinarily obtains informed consent to any treatment he proposes.
Consequently, an argument could be made that the physician's responsibility should end with diagnosis, including recognition of suicidal
thoughts and impulses; explanation of the disease, including risk of
201. Despite compelling and persuasive theoretical arguments, legitimate questions
about intervention may be raised because present knowledge indicates 25 patients
will be subjected to unnecessary restrictions of freedom and invasions of privacy
to preserve a single life. In a free society, this may simply be an unacceptable
ratio and an unjustifiable use of resources in a system which already rations
health care.
202. See infra text accompanying note 216. Estimates do vary. For example, one psychiatrist argued 85 to 90 percent of suicides were the result of serious mental
illness. However, another doctor claims that no sane person would kill himself.
Schwartz, supra note 92, at 232.
203. Some psychiatrists argue that suicidal people are actually ambivalent about their
wish to die. Further, these physicians believe the will to live is stronger than the
desire to die in the majority of suicidal persons. Norman L. Farberow et al., Evaluation and Management of Suicidal Persons, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUICIDE
273, 274 (1970). Such a belief may be used to justify intervention.
204. See infra note 216.
Two psychologists claim their investigations reveal "each individual has a potential for suicide within himself as well as a desire to live a constructive, fulfilling life." Firestone & Seiden, supra note 30, at 209.
205. Contrast this with the fact that an increasingly intense debate over the past
twenty years has resulted in greatly enhanced procedural rights prior to involuntary commitment. Substantive criteria have also been established, in addition to
the requirement that treatment be the least restrictive alternative. All's Well,
supra, note 9, at 318.
206. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on the option chosen, he then acts for the
patient, overriding the patient's stated desires. Such a decision must be distressing to the physician, but further consideration of this unilateral declaration of at
least partial incompetency is beyond the scope of this paper.
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suicide; and treatment of the underlying disorder. However, this is
not the standard, and the doctrine of informed consent fails to insulate
physicians from an obligation to attempt to prevent suicide.207
A.

Informed Consent

Physicians seek informed consent prior to initiating medical treatment. They explain the disease and proposed treatment plan, including potential risks, to enable the competent patient to make informed
decisions about suggested procedures. A necessary corollary to the
competent person's right to consent to treatment is his right to refuse
treatment. If the patient persists in refusing treatment after the physician carefully explains the probable course of the disease and consequences of failure to submit to the proposed treatment, he has given
informed consent to withhold treatment. Most courts, legislators and
commentators agree that the patient's right to refuse treatment
should be honored.
Similar analysis may be appropriate when the patient is suicidal
and the proposed medical treatment is psychiatric.208 The physician
will attempt to persuade his suicidal patient to submit to the proposed
treatment plan, but may be unsuccessful. In those rare cases in which
suicidal thoughts and impulses are not the result of underlying psychiatric illness, the patient should be permitted to reject psychiatric
treatment and choose suicide.209 The physician should explore with
the patient his reasons for suicidal tendencies and explain the probable consequences of acting on them. However, if the patient continues to refuse treatment following these disclosures and explorations,
his right to self-determination should be respected. This means, of
207. Indeed, because "[s]uicide is a societal ailment of tremendous proportion," Kate
E. Bloch, Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention" Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. Rsv. 929, 930
(1987), it has even been suggested that a legal duty to report threats be imposed
upon any person who hears of such a threat. Id. at 945.
208. See Loren H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment. Law and
Medicine at the Interface,35 EMORY L.J. 139,142-57 (1986), for a brief background
of the right to refuse psychiatric treatment.
209. The authors of a recent study of psychiatric patients who refused treatment raise
an interesting question. See, Stephen K. Hoge et al., A Prospective,Multicenter
Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotropic Medication, 47 ARCHiVF_ GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 949, 949 (1990). They refer to the continuing debate over the proper
scope of the right to refuse treatment, and standards and procedures to determine
when refusal may be ignored. "Mental health professionals, in general, favor approaches that emphasize appropriate treatment, whereas many legal advocates
favor models that focus on patients' rights to determine their own care." Id. The
authors attribute this lack of consensus not only to "differences in perspective,
but also the lack of reliable information about the overall effects of the right to
refuse treatment." Id. Predicting suicide suffers from similar problems.
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course, the physician would not be liable if the patient does commit
suicide.
The situation is more difficult if suicidal thoughts and impulses are
results of mental disorder. As with any patient,2 10 the physician
should explain the disorder and the proposed treatment plan, including the likelihood of success and the high probability that when the
disease is treated suicidal thoughts will disappear.
The patient might refuse treatment for many reasons, including an
unwillingness to endure further suffering. At this point the physician
is faced with a serious dilemma: accede to the patient's self-destructive desire or overrule him through coercive intervention. Although
such intervention may violate a person's rights to privacy, liberty and
autonomy, two important distinctions justify treating some mentally
ill patients differently from those suffering from physical illnesses.
First, people suffering from physical illness who are permitted to
choose to die2ll have no possibility of recovery. Second, mental disorders underlying suicidal impulses may directly affect cognitive
abilities.
Cases allowing a physically ill patient the right to die focus on his
210. Many mentally ill patients are no less likely to comprehend what their physician
tells them than are people who are physically ill. They have the same fundamental rights of privacy, autonomy and liberty, and even people who have been involuntarily committed may have the right to refuse treatment. Limitations on the
right to refuse treatment exist only if 1) the mentally ill person has been adjudicated incompetent, or 2) there is an emergency where the mentally ill person
"poses an immediate threat of physical harm to himself or others." In re Orr, 531
N.E.2d 64, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Even if he is dangerous, drugs should be forcibly
administered only after considering alternative treatments. Id.
For example, when three inpatients refused psychotropic medication, the New
York Court of Appeals rejected the notion that either mental illness or involuntary commitment "without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that
they lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision."
Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342 (N.Y. 1986). Involuntarily committed patients
were seeking recognition of their right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. Referring
to "considerable authority within the psychiatric community," the court acknowledged that "the presence of mental illness does not ipso facto warrant a finding
of incompetency." Id. Nevertheless, the court also denied that the patient's
rights were absolute and concluded when a compelling state interest exists,
courts may intervene. Id. This is only permissible, however, when the patient is
proven, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unable to make a competent decision for himself. See, e.g., In re Charles C., 562 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. Div. 1990)(rejecting the idea that the clear and convincing standard of incompetency had been
met even though the patient's testimony was "somewhat rambling and incoherent.")
Arguably, however, the right to refuse psychotropic medication can not be
stretched to grant a suicidal patient a right to end his life. This is because, even in
these cases, courts generally find a compelling state interest, and permit intervention, denying the right to refuse treatment where the patient is a danger to
himself or others. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 225-28.

1992]

SUICIDE

quality of life now and in the future. Although the legal system no
longer requires the physically ill person to be terminal or even in
great pain, he must have a serious illness or disability and no chance
for improvement. Courts recognize the right to die because denial
would only prolong suffering without hope of recovery. Physically ill
or disabled patients who choose to die will not recover from their underlying disorder.
The mentally ill, suicidal person's present quality of life is also bad.
In addition, if he is not permitted to die, he will be forced to endure
further suffering during his treatment. However, the similarity ends
there. The mentally ill patient generally recovers, and is no longer
suicidal. Psychiatric treatments have improved so that four of five
people suffering from these underlying diseases improve,212 and the
concomitant suicidal wishes usually disappear with those improvements.2 13 Further, even though the suicidal patient is apparently competent,2 14 illnesses which increase the risk of suicide may also affect
cognitive abilities. 215 Certainly physical pain and illness may influence a patient's decisions, but the direct and immediate effect on cognition frequently present in the mentally ill person has not been
established in the physically ill.
These differences may justify intervention, even without the patient's consent. Nevertheless, difficulty in predicting 1) which suicidal person will take his own life, 2) which intervention is indicated,
and 3) which mentally ill person will get better with the proposed in212. R.F. Prien, The Somatic Treatment of UnipolarDepression Disorder,in 7 REVIEW OF PsYCHIATRY 215 (Allen J. Frances & Robert E. Hales eds., 1988).
213. Brent et al., supra note 49, at 365.
214. Recently the Supreme Court further complicated the issue. In Zinermon v.
Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990), the Court questioned the competence of a mentally
ill person "to make a knowing and willful decision" to consent to hospitalization.
Id. at 987. However, while some mentally ill people are incapable of informed
consent, others retain "a significant capacity for normal and rational thought and
action." Bruce J. Winick, Voluntary Hospitalizationafter Zinermon v. Burch, 21
PsYcHIATRIc ANNALS 584, 587 (1991). Indeed, the Court's apparent distinction in
accepting decisions of physically ill but not mentally ill patients represents "a
largely mistaken view of the impact of mental illness on decision-making capacity." Id. at 586. Pain and stress of any illness sufficient to require hospitalization,
in addition to difficulty in understanding medical information, may easily impair
the ability of the physically ill patient to give informed consent. Id. at 587. Professor Winick's argument is particularly interesting and relevant to the transparently artificial distinction courts repeatedly raise in the right to die cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 228-45.
215. Cf Phil Brown, Psychiatric Treatment Refusal Patient Competence, and Informed Consent, 8 INT'L J. L. & PsYcHIATRY 83, 89 (1985). "Informed consent
involves three components-the informed nature of consent, the voluntariness of
the consent, and the patient's competency. In fact it is often difficult to distinguish them, especially informed nature and competency, since the person's
mental competence so strongly determines his cognitive abilities." Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
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tervention means that the physician should be able to discharge his
legal duty by recognizing the risk of suicide, considering the proposed
options, informing his patient and documenting he has done so.
B.

The Right to Die Includes Suicide

When the decision to commit suicide is not a product of an underlying disorder,2 16 a "rational suicide,"217 the analysis is different2l 8 and
intervention is difficult to justify. 219 Advocates of the notion that
some suicides are rational propose permitting, and possibly even assisting,2 2 0 suicide.221 However, this "rational suicide" theory is problematic for several reasons. Although adoption of the theory would
presumably protect the physician who fails to intervene from liability,
the label is simply too vague to be meaningful or helpful in deciding
which option to chose. Neither the legal system nor the medical estab216. The majority of suicides do have an underlying mental disorder. However, not all
do. For example, one recent Finnish study concluded that 94% of adolescent suicides suffer from a mental disorder. This means, of course, that 6% do not. Marttunen et al., supra note 24, at 835.
217. It is considered a rational suicide if a terminally ill person decides to kill himself.
James Podgers, 'RationalSuicide' Raises Patient Rights Issues, 66 LAWsCOPE
1499 (1980).
218. For an interesting article explaining libertarian support for the right to suicide
see generally Rolf Sartorius, Coercive Suicide Prevention: A LibertarianPerspective, 13 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 293 (1983).

219. Indeed, some suggest intervention is inappropriate unless the suicidal person voluntarily seeks help. Thomas Szasz, for example, claims suicide may be an exercise of free will. Thomas S. Szasz, The Ethics of Suicide, in BETWEEN SURVIVAL
AND SUICIDE 163, 175 (Benjamin B. Wolman & Herbert H. Krauss eds., 1976).
One author, a physician and J.D. candidate, raised an interesting point in support of physician intervention to prevent suicide. See generally Michael R. Flick,
The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1991). Dr. Flick suggested that
suicide attempts are generally "for reasons other than a settled desire to die." Id.
at 1125. Rejecting the idea that people attempt suicide because they want to die,
he claimed "[s]elf-destruction can be a reaching out not to death but to others, a
plea for their attention, love, and concern." Id. at 1128-29. Therefore, the physician's job is to offer patients the option to reappraise and live their lives. "The
ground for interference is not so much the sanctity of life as it is the finality of
death. A person can only be condemned to live for a finite time-but death is
forever." Id.
The author builds on this argument, explaining that once a patient is permitted to choose to die, no way exists to determine if that was the correct decision.
Further, if it was a bad decision, once the patient is dead, no way to correct it
exists. Id. at 1128.
220. It is interesting to note that voters in Washington state recently rejected legislation to permit physician-assisted suicide. Philip J. Boyle, Vote Shows that Euthanasia Debate Will Go On, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at F17. Nevertheless, the
close vote is seen as an indication that the debate is not over. The American Bar
Association has also refused to endorse physician-assisted suicide. ABA Adopts
Lawyer Discipline Model But Resists CallforGreaterOpenness, 60 U.S.L.W. 2491
(Feb. 11, 1992). However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
221. See generally All's Well, supra note 9.
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lishment presently provide for different treatment depending on
whether the suicide is rational. Further, requiring the doctor to evaluate whether a decision to commit suicide is rational inevitably introduces inappropriate moral and ethical judgments 222 into what
should be solely a medical decision. Using rationality as the test would
force physicians to decide questions for which they have no particular
expertise. In addition, if the physician's duty to his patient was dependent on whether the suicide was rational, he would presumably be
subject to liability for conclusions, reached without explicit legal or
medical guidance, with which a jury later disagreed.
Instead of this uncertain and inappropriate evaluation, the law
should expect the physician to make only the more objective, medical
decisions for which he has been trained. Legal or ethical evaluations
should be left either to courts or agencies better suited to make them,
or to the individual himself. The physician's duty to his patient should
be satisfied if he, with due care, reaches the conclusion that suicidal
thoughts and impulses are not the result of an underlying mental disorder and so informs his patient.2 23 This apparently radical conclusion
is actually consistent with-indeed seems almost mandated by--an
honest evaluation of recent cases and statutes2 24 acknowledging fundamental individual rights to autonomy and to choose to die.
C. The Right to Die
The early, so-called right to die cases recognized only a right to
222. In an interesting article, a physician and a lawyer argue it is not clear exactly how
to determine another person's best interests. H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. &
Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36
S.W.L.J. 1003, 1006 (1982). Such a judgment requires establishing priorities of
benefits and detriments. "This ordering, however, presupposes a particular
moral or evaluational sense, and is therefore irradicably [sic] subjective." Id. at
1007. The article supports the libertarian view that "the individual, not the state,

is considered the supreme judge of his own best interests. The individual is held
to have a right to self-determination, free choice, and autonomy." Id. at 1010.

223. A persuasive argument can be made that a person suffering from an underlying
mental disorder ought to be permitted to end his life.
[I]t is not so obvious that to prevent someone who is mentally ill from
committing suicide is necessarily to bestow a blessing. The woman who,
despite medical evidence to the contrary, is convinced she has cancer
may be mistaken, but, if her delusion persists, she may nevertheless find

death preferable to a protracted life of fear and anxiety. Though her
beliefs may be in error, her emotions may be just as acute and distressing
as if they had been well-founded in physiological reality.
Greenberg, supra note 70, at 236. Ironically, the author does not suggest that a
physician should not intervene in such a case.
224. Statutory prohibitions are not uniform. Several courts and legislators find a constitutional right to terminate any treatment, but others prohibit the withdrawal
of food and water. See Wendy Ann Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to ForegoArtificial Nutritionand Hydration UnderMaryland's
Life-Sustaining ProceduresAct, 47 MD. L. REv. 1188, 1190-91 (1988).
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refuse medical treatment. Courts concluded that a competent person 225 had a right, generally arising from his constitutional right to
privacy,226 to refuse even life-saving medical treatment. 227 These patients, who were suffering great physical pain, were permitted to
choose to "die with dignity" by rejecting intrusive medical procedures.
Courts distinguished these situations from suicide because, absent the
extraordinary medical care, terminal patients would die from their
underlying medical illness22S whereas the suicidal patient's own selfdestructive acts, rather than an underlying illness, were the cause of
death.229 Although factually correct, the distinction was difficult to
225. Many courts face the problem of the conflict between the rights of the incompetent patient and the appropriate limits of substituted judgment. The most notable, and the only case to reach the Supreme Court, is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes
253-66. These questions are beyond the scope of this article.
226. See, e.g., M. Lisa Wilson-Clayton & Mark A. Clayton, Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back" McKay v. Bergstedt, 12 WHrrrmR L. REv. 439, 440-41 (1991); Ben A.
Rich, The Assault on Privacyin HealthcareDecisionmaking,68 DENv. U.L. REV.
1 (1991).
227. A recent Nevada case concluded that the individual's right to refuse extraordinary medical treatment outweighs claimed State interests. McKay v. Bergstedt,
801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). Petitioner, a 31-year-old quadriplegic, requested that
the court permit him to be removed from his respirator because his father, who
was his caretaker, was dying. He also asked for medication to minimize the pain,
and that the person assisting in his death be protected from liability. Id. at 620.
The court began its analysis with a balancing test. On one side was the petitioner's individual interest in autonomy or freedom to determine his own medical
treatment. On the other side were several "significant" State interests. These
include preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties, preserving the integrity of the medical profession and encouraging charitable and
humane care of sick people. Id. at 621-28. Acknowledging the importance to each
person of "the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others," the Nevada court explained that the right is not absolute
but must be balanced against the State's interests. Id. at 621 (quoting Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990)(quoting Union Pacific
R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891))). Still, the court also recognized a fundamental privacy right to withhold or withdraw from medical treatment which prolongs
life, and that a person's liberty interest is implicated in right to die cases. At some
point, a patient's "quality of life may be so dismal" that his rights must prevail.
Emphasizing that the case involved a competent adult, the court said "[iln instances where the prospects for a life of quality are smothered by physical pain
and suffering, only the sufferer can determine the value of continuing mortality."
Id. at 624.
See also All's Well, supra note 9, at 317 ("Preventing suicides means someone
else is making a decision that a potential suicide attempter is better off suffering
alive than dead.")
228. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 (Mass. 1977).
229. A New Jersey case explored the State interests in preserving life, preventing suicides, safeguarding the medical profession's integrity and protecting innocent
third parties. However, the court in In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987), concluded that the right of the patient to refuse medical treatment outweighed these

1992]

SUICIDE

justify. In truth, the direct cause of the patient's death was his choice
to refuse medical treatment. Nevertheless, courts viewed this choice
as merely hastening death rather than causing it.
Even if the distinction had merit in the past, it is simply not credible in light of the law's evolution. Courts and legislators in several
states have expanded a patient's constitutionally-based privacy right
to refuse medical treatment to include the right to reject artificial nutrition and hydration.230 Such a decision means the patient will not
die from his underlying physical ailment, but rather from starvation.231 The right has been further broadened to include a patient who
is neither in great physical pain nor terminal, but is suffering from a
232
condition which is not going to improve.
Having ventured this far down the path of self-determination, however, courts refuse to take the final step and recognize that these cases
are similar to a competent adult's choice to commit suicide. Courts
stubbornly cling to some imagined distinction. In fact, courts frequently assert the difference as if simply stating it proves it exists.
Judges disingenously claim that the patient who refuses artificial nutrition and hydration, unlike the suicidal patient, is not choosing to
die, but rather wants to live without that particular procedure. 233
Ironically, Bouvia v. Superior Court of Californiawhich tried to perpetuate this distinction,234 actually exposed the flaw in the arguments
attempting to limit the right to die.
Elizabeth Bouvia, a 28-year-old quadriplegic, "totally dependent"

230.
231.

232.
233.

234.

State interests. Id. at 416. Still, as in other right to die cases, the Farrellcourt
specifically distinguished suicide from refusing medical treatment, finding support in the action versus inaction distinction. The court approved the refusal of
medical treatment because if the patient dies, it is "'the result, primarily of the
underlying disease, and not the result of self-inflicted injury."' Id. at 411 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985)). Although this may be true,
focus on such a technical distinction seems absurd.
See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (N.J. 1985).
In fact, one commentator, writing prior to the recent refusal of hydration and
food cases, used starvation as an example of an impermissible method of suicide.
Richard Sherlock, For Everything There is a Season: The Right to Die in the
United States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 557-58. He contrasted this with the approved right to refuse medical treatment. Following this analysis, Professor
Sherlock concluded that "it is impossible to establish any systematic, coherent
legal differentiation between suicide and the refusal of clearly life-saving medical
therapy. In all legally relevant particulars the individual who refuses to take
nourishment is no different than the person who refuses treatment." Id. at 558.
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986). See infra
text accompanying notes 234-52.
See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,1224 (N.J. 1985); Rebecca C. Morgan, How to
Decide: Decisions on Life-Prolonging Procedures, 20 STESON L. REv. 77, 86
(1991).
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
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for all her needs,235 was permitted to refuse involuntary feeding
through a nasogastric tube even in the absence of a terminal illness or
great physical pain. She was an intelligent, mentally competent woman who had several times expressed the desire to die. The court recognized that fundamental state and federal rights of privacy include
the right to reject medical treatment 23 6 even if such refusal causes a
2
life threatening condition. 37
Bouvia could have lived another fifteen or twenty years, but the
appellate court disagreed with the trial judge's decision that preserving her life outweighed her right to decide. Such a conclusion "mistakenly attached undue importance to the amount of time possibly
available to petitioner, and failed to give equal weight and consideration for the quality of that life; an equal, if not more significant, consideration." 238 In other words, permitting a patient to reject medical
treatment generally hastens death, which is justified because the patient's quality of life is so diminished. 23 9 This "moral and philosophical decision" 240 belongs to the individual, whether the patient's life
expectancy is "15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to 20 days, if such
life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose
[are] gone." 241 The court seems to imply that there is even more reason to permit the patient to choose to die when he is not terminal. 242
"It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical practitioners to assert
their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or more accurately, endure, for '15 to 20 years.' We cannot conceive it to be the
policy of this State to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone." 243
Unfortunately, however, the court stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the similarity between Elizabeth Bouvia's permissible decision
to refuse forced feeding and an unacceptable decision to commit suicide. Instead, the judges conclude she "merely resigned herself to ac235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 303. See also McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 617 (Nev. 1990).
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Of course, the finality of death, and the inability to rectify the mistake if it is the
wrong choice, is a problem in the case of the physically impaired as well.
Ironically, after having been granted the right to refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration, Elizabeth Bouvia changed her mind. Two years later she explained
she still believed individuals should have the right to decide whether to continue
suffering. "The irony, of course, is that as the result of her court victory the
threat to her ability to voice that conviction was that the decision would be executed." Flick, supra note 219, at 1128. Dr. Flick argued "Elizabeth Bouvia did not
want to be put out of her suffering-she just did not want to be abandoned to it."

Id.
243. Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986).
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cept an earlier death, if necessary, rather than live by feedings forced
upon her by means of a nasogastric tube. Her decision to allow nature
to take its course is not equivalent to an election to commit suicide
...
."244 Nevertheless, apparently recognizing the shaky ground on
which its argument stands, the court refused to define suicide, or even
consider the patient's "motive" in exercising her right to refuse treatment. "If a right exists, it matters not what 'motivates' its
exercise."2s
Thus, Bouvia protects the right of the patient to refuse food and
water as long as he denies the desire to commit suicide and does not
need a third person to engage in "affirmative, assertive, proximate,
direct conduct such as furnishing a gun, poison, [a] knife."246 The
question is, of course, whether permitting a patient to refuse food and
water, and thus to starve, is so different from these affirmative acts as
to justify different treatment. The Bouvia court's conclusion that
they are is simply unconvincing.
Concurring Judge Compton is far more honest, even implicitly
chastisizing the majority for its need to "dance" around the issue. He
points out that Elizabeth Bouvia wanted to die, and under the circumstances, cannot be blamed "if she wants to fold her cards and say 'I am
out."'247 He objects that the state's prohibition on assisting suicide
compels her to deny her wish to end her life.248 "If there is ever a
time when we ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs' it
is when we face death-either by choice or otherwise." 249
In fact, Bouvia and other right to die cases actually support the
right of the competent, but mentally troubled, individual to choose to
end his life. As even the Bouvia court acknowledges, exploring the
patient's motive is not appropriate. If the cause of death is directly
attributable to an individual's choice, the vehicle the patient uses to
achieve his goal makes little, if any, difference. 250 However, despite a
strong hint that suicide might be acceptable as "probably the ultimate
244. Id. at 306.

245. Id.
246. Id.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 308 (Compton, J., concurring).
For a similar argument, see generally Suicidal Competence, supra note 19. However, that author concludes that in cases where the patient's decision "strongly
resembles suicide, the policy reasons for preventing suicide should be weighed
into the balance between the patient's and the State's interests." Id. at 743.
Although most of these policy arguments have been challenged, she said, the potential for saving lives and helping those who are, by their suicidal acts, asking for
help, outweighs any potential affront to autonomy of the patient. 'Before setting
a person free to die, society should try to set her free to live by seeking to relieve
her despair and hopelessness. Legal provisions for temporary restraint and counseling are an acceptable compromise between the values of autonomy and self-
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exercise of one's right to privacy," 25 ' courts continue to distinguish a
patient's "decision to allow nature to take its course... [from] an election to commit suicide."

252

The Supreme Court has never decided whether a right to suicide
exists. The Court did recently conclude "a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.253 The conclusion was merely dicta, but the case is interesting
for its analysis and recognition of problems created by earlier judicial
attempts to establish appropriate boundaries in the changing environment of right to die cases.
Even though "squarely presented" 2M with the issue of whether the
United States Constitution provides a right to die, the Cruzan Court
neatly avoided establishing limits, if any, on a patient's decision to end
his life.255 The Court's refusal to allow life-sustaining treatment withdrawn was not because Nancy Cruzan did not have the right to make
this irrevocable decision, nor because her interest was outweighed by a
compelling State interest. In fact, the Court suggested exactly the
opposite when it said "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision." 256 The Court simply decided a State may, based on
its strong interest in protecting human life, legitimately require clear
and convincing evidence the patient would have wanted treatment
withdrawn.257 The problem was petitioners failed to prove Nancy
Cruzan, who had been in a persistent vegetative state for six years and
thus could not be consulted, if aware of her condition, would have
made that choice. 258

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.

determination on the one hand, and compassion and social responsibility on the
other." Id. at 751.
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
Id.
Nancy Cruzan had been in a persistent vegetative state since a car accident six
years earlier. Her parents sought to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition
when it became clear she had no chance for recovery. The Court recognized
"'the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference ....... Id. at 2846 (quoting Union Pacific P.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). Further, the Court found that the right to
self-determination generally outweighs countervailing State interests and permits people to refuse even life-saving medical treatment. Most cases which reach
a contrary result focus on" 'the patient's competency to make a rational and considered choice."' Id. at 2848 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J.
1985)). However, the Court unequivocally stated that these rights are not absolute. Whether rights are violated depends on balancing the patient's liberty interest against relevant State interests.
Id. at 2852.
Id. at 2852-53.
Id. at 2854-55. The Court also decided that the refusal to accept the substituted
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More important for purposes of its analogy to suicide, the Court
rejected a recurring but inappropriate distinction: "the distinction between actively hastening death by terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of a disease. "259 However, the Court
refused to take the final, logical step and acknowledge that a competent individual has the right to choose to die-regardless of his reason.
Instead, the Supreme Court joined others in distinguishing between
right to die cases and suicides.
In his interesting, but ultimately disappointing, concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia employed an analysis which toyed with candidly recognizing the absurdity of the distinction but he, like the majority,
stopped short of the logical conclusion. He argued convincingly
against the distinction between action and inaction and found it an
"unreasonable" place to draw the line. "It would not make much
sense to say that one may not kill oneself by walking into the sea, but
may sit on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide,"2 60 Justice Scalia correctly opined. Such a distinction does "not make much
sense." In fact, although he refuses to acknowledge it, both are
suicides.
Indeed, Justice Scalia appears to agree that "[s]tarving oneself to
death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the
common-law definition of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in
both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to 'pu[t] an end to his own
existence.' "261 But then Justice Scalia inexplicably retreats. Because
states have the power to prohibit suicide, "[iut is not even reasonable,
much less required by the Constitution,"2 62 that the State be prevented from intervening. Justice Scalia apparently can reach this conclusion because he, unlike his colleagues who dissented, rejects the
idea of a constitutional guarantee of a right to die.263
judgment of close family members did not violate due process. Id. at 2855-56.
Following the Supreme Court decision, petitioners located additional witnesses
who testified that Nancy Cruzan, prior to the accident, had expressed a desire to
refuse treatment if she were in such a condition. The Court concluded that petitioner satisfied the clear and convincing standard and, thus, permitted the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition. Nancy Cruzan died a short time later.

Life-Support Removed, Coma PatientCruzan Dies, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1990, at

pl .
259. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2849 (1990)(citing In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985)).
260. Id. at 2861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
261. Id. (quoting 4 WiLLzIA BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAiEs *189). Justice Scalia also
concedes that, in balancing the interests of the patient and State, "there is nothing distinctive about accepting death through the refusal of 'medical treatment,'
as opposed to accepting it through the refusal of food, or through the failure to
shut off the engine and get out of the car after parking in one's garage after
work." Id. at 2862 (Scalia, J., concurring).
262. Id.
263. For an interesting, exhaustive article rejecting the notion of a constitutional right
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By contrast, Justice Stevens presents a convincing argument that
each individual possesses a constitutional right to choose to die.
"Choices about death touch the core of liberty." 264 Further, the need
to analyze and understand mortality is "'so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "265
Justice Stevens explains that, by interfering with the individual's
choice, the Court permits an "unreasonable intrusion upon traditionally private matters encompassed within the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause."2

66

Emotional suffering is not less painful than physical pain; consequently, no justification to treat them differently exists. 267 Mental
pain may so adversely affect a person's quality of life that he wants to
die. However, the mentally ill person generally does not have an underlying physical illness which, if allowed "to take its course," would
cause his death. Therefore, if mental anguish is the source of the patient's choice to end his life, "affirmative, assertive" 268 acts are necessary to achieve the goal. Judicial or physician intervention would only
be appropriate if the decision is not actually a "choice" but rather the
result of an underlying mental disorder. In other words, judges and
physicians should not attempt to prevent self-destruction26 9-whether
the immediate cause of death is refusal of medical treatment or some

264.
265.
266.
267.

268.
269.

to suicide, see generally Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional
Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1985).
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2885 (1990)(Stevens, J.,
concurring).
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
Id. at 2882.
It is troubling that the Dutch government recently utilized this same inappropriate distinction. Laws in the Netherlands continue to prohibit assisting suicide,
but it has been more than 20 years since a doctor has been prosecuted. Marlise
Simons, Dutch Survey Casts New Light on Patients Who Choose to Die, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1991, at B7. Medical experts attribute this tolerance to public
approval of the practice, and establishment of criteria for assisting suicide. Physicians require repeated requests by a fully conscious patient and an independent
consultation with another physician. Further, physicians will only assist suicide
if the patient is terminally ill with no hope of improvement, and the victim of
physical or great mental suffering. Nevertheless, the Dutch Ministry of Health
recently issued a letter warning all doctors that mental suffering does not justify
assisting suicide. Specialists suggest the main purpose of this notice was to protect psychiatric patients who might not be capable of informed consent. Id.
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Cal., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
One author raises an interesting argument. Wrongful Living, supra note 69.
Recognition of a right to die creates "a correlative duty to act in such a manner as
not to infringe upon that right." Id. at 636. Professor Oddi suggests that physicians who treat competent patients who have refused medical treatment have
breached this duty. Whether interference with his patient's right to die was intentional or negligent, the physician's conduct was tortious. Based on this analysis, he proposed creation of a "wrongful living" cause of action, where damages
would be awarded for prolonging life. Id. at 637-39.
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affirmative, assertive act-when there is no mental disease. In the absence of an illness, the patient should be permitted to kill himself and
the doctor should not be subject to liability.
IX. CONCLUSION
The physician who treats a suicidal patient faces difficult, urgent
decisions. The legal system imposes malpractice liability if the physician fails to predict suicide when other physicians in his specialty
would have done so. However, current medical research provides risk
factors which do not adequately predict which patient will commit
suicide.
This article suggests the physician be protected from malpractice
liability if he follows the proposed guidelines. Initially, the physician
must determine whether the suicidal patient suffers from an underlying mental disorder. If he does, the physician must carefully review
the continuum of options, applying the risk factors, and employ the
least restrictive alternative he believes will prevent suicide. If he does
so, the patient has received proper care and the physician should be
shielded from malpractice liability, even if his patient commits suicide.
If the patient does not have an underlying mental disorder, or at
least suicidal thoughts and impulses are not a product of such mental
disorder, the physician has no legal responsibility in relation to the
suicide.

